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INTRODUCTION
In 2006, shareholders of a Ukrainian metals plant challenged a looting
scheme that sucked hundreds of millions of dollars out of the plant and into
American and foreign corporations.1 The shareholders sued a group of
Ukrainian and Russian billionaires, American businessmen, and foreign and
domestic companies in the Massachusetts federal district court, alleging
violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO)
Act.2 Specifically, the shareholders charged that the billionaire-defendants

1 Athina Invs. Ltd. v. Pinchuk, 443 F. Supp. 2d 177, 178–79 (D. Mass. 2006); Complaint at 1–3,
Athina, 443 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D. Mass. 2006) (No. 06-cv-10560); see George Bochetto, Taking Exception
to ‘Justice, Russian Style,’ FORBES (Mar. 19, 2008), https://www.forbes.com/2008/03/19/russia-legallawyers-cx_0319marksletter.html?sh=674e588fb4cd [https://perma.cc/E38G-WXTV].
2 Complaint, supra note 1, at 1–3. Among the named individual defendants were Ukrainian
billionaire Victor Pinchuk, Russian billionaires Alexander Abramov and Viktor Vekselberg, and
businessmen Jerry Margulis and Alexander Novack, both U.S. citizens. Id. at 34–35.
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took control of the metals plant, entered self-dealing contracts, diverted
profits through U.S. banks into companies under the defendants’ control, and
paid bribes and kickbacks to Ukrainian government officials.3
The day after the shareholders filed their RICO complaint, an article
detailing the allegations against billionaire-defendant Viktor Vekselberg
appeared in a Russian newspaper.4 Vekselberg responded by directing a
Swiss company he owned to file a defamation lawsuit against Igor
Kolomoisky, the beneficial owner of shareholder Athina Investments, in a
Moscow arbitration court.5
Six months later, the shareholders asked the Massachusetts district
court to issue a foreign antisuit injunction preventing Vekselberg from
continuing the parallel Moscow suit.6 The shareholders argued that
Vekselberg’s parallel suit aimed “to subvert the[] Massachusetts action by
placing extreme financial pressure on Mr. Kolomoisky.”7 While the named
parties in the Moscow suit were different in name from those in the
Massachusetts suit, the district court observed that the “real parties driving
the parallel suits” were similar enough.8 Likewise, both suits sought to
resolve whether Vekselberg and his coconspirators bribed the Ukrainian
government.9 So the Massachusetts court considered the Moscow suit a
parallel proceeding.10
The court further acknowledged that the Moscow action looked like “a
baseless exercise in legal gamesmanship” seeking “to thwart plaintiffs’
willingness and financial ability to continue on with the Massachusetts
action.”11 Nonetheless, the court denied the foreign antisuit injunction
motion out of respect for the Russian arbitration court.12 Within a few
months, the parties settled.13 The outcome in Athina Investments Ltd. v.
Pinchuk is not surprising: most U.S. federal courts avoid interfering with
international parallel proceedings, even to avoid unfairness and the
inefficiency of duplicative lawsuits.
3

Id. at 10–15.
Athina, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 178.
5 Id.
6 Id.; see infra Part I (discussing international parallel proceedings).
7 Athina, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 178.
8
Id. at 181.
9 Id. at 180.
10 Id. at 181.
11 Id. at 179.
12 Id. at 181–82.
13 See id. at 178–79 (acknowledging that the Moscow suit threatened plaintiffs’ financial capacity to
continue litigating in Massachusetts); Notice of Dismissal at 1, Athina, 443 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D. Mass.
2006) (No. 06-cv-10560); Bochetto, supra note 1 (reporting that the parties in Athina settled).
4
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International parallel proceedings are identical, related, or similar
lawsuits in multiple countries.14 A party seeking to consolidate parallel
proceedings into a single case may request relief in a U.S. court through one
of a few judge-created common law remedies. First, the court can issue an
antisuit injunction, preventing the opposing party from litigating in the
foreign forum.15 Second, the lis alibi pendens doctrine allows the court to
temporarily stay the domestic case pending resolution of the foreign case—
the mirror image of an antisuit injunction.16 Third, under the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, the court may dismiss the domestic case, allowing
the foreign case to continue.17 This Note focuses on the first option, exploring
the standards U.S. federal courts apply when ruling on antisuit injunction
motions, before attempting to test the relationship between antisuit
injunction decisions and the probability of settlement.18
Foreign antisuit injunctions allow U.S. courts to halt parties from
participating in parallel litigation in a foreign forum.19 Federal circuit courts
have split over the appropriate legal standard for foreign antisuit
injunctions—specifically, over the degree of deference domestic courts owe

14

See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES
COURTS 531 (6th ed. 2018); Samantha Koeninger & Richard Bales, When a U.S. Domestic Court Can
Enjoin a Foreign Court Proceeding, 22 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 473, 475 (2014). Because this
Note focuses on civil litigation in U.S. federal courts, the term “international parallel proceedings” will
most often refer to parallel cases in one U.S. court and one foreign court. See infra Part I.
15 BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 14, at 532.
16 Id.; see Finova Capital Corp. v. Ryan Helicopters U.S.A., Inc., 180 F.3d 896, 900–01 (7th Cir.
1999); Turner Ent. Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1523 (11th Cir. 1994); Evergreen Marine
Corp. v. Welgrow Int’l Inc., 954 F. Supp. 101, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); see also Maggie Gardner, Deferring
to Foreign Courts, 169 U. PA. L. REV. 2291, 2335–36 (2021) (explaining how the U.S. and European
approaches to lis alibi pendens differ). Professor Gardner suggests pragmatic reforms to U.S. lis alibi
pendens: rejecting consideration of foreign relations, she encourages courts to start with a presumption
of retaining jurisdiction, then focus on the progression of the foreign litigation and the connection of the
dispute to each of the competing forums. Gardner, supra, at 2339, 2343–45, 2349. For an argument
favoring reliance on international comity in lis alibi pendens decisions, see N. Jansen Calamita,
Rethinking Comity: Towards a Coherent Treatment of International Parallel Proceedings, 27 U. PA. J.
INT’L ECON. L. 601, 641–78 (2006).
17 BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 14, at 532; see Contact Lumber Co. v. P.T. Moges Shipping Co.,
918 F.2d 1446, 1454 (9th Cir. 1990); Brinco Mining Ltd. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 552 F. Supp. 1233, 1242
(D.D.C. 1982); see also Maggie Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, 92 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 390, 391–
400, 423–27 (2017) (urging the abolishment of forum non conveniens because it gives judges unguided
discretion and sometimes undermines U.S. foreign relations).
18 This Note, and the empirical study within, define settlement to mean the resolution of disputes
through private agreement or mediation, stipulated voluntary dismissal, default judgment, or dismissal
for lack of prosecution—not judgment on the merits, nor for jurisdictional or procedural reasons. See
Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and Why Should We Care?, 6 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 116–17 (2009); infra Section III.C.
19 Infra Part II.
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to the apparent interests of a foreign nation. This deference is called
“international comity.”20
Courts and scholars discussing foreign antisuit injunctions have focused
on the tension between international comity on one hand and the policy
interests of the court and litigants on the other, especially efficiency and
fairness.21 The dominant restrictive approach,22 valuing international comity
above efficiency, creates a strong presumption in favor of allowing
international parallel proceedings to continue at least until one of the courts
reaches a final judgment.23 By contrast, the permissive approach emphasizes
efficiency over comity: permissive courts more readily enjoin efforts to
litigate duplicative cases abroad.24 Athina exemplifies the practical
significance of the circuit split. The Massachusetts district court, sitting in a
restrictive circuit, leaned heavily on international comity in denying the
plaintiffs’ foreign antisuit injunction motion.25
Because international comity is a vague and flexible notion,26 it is
difficult to balance against unrelated policy concerns affecting individual
litigants such as efficiency, fairness, convenience to litigants, and avoiding

20 Goss Int’l Corp. v. Man Roland Druckmaschinen Aktiengesellschaft, 491 F.3d 355, 359–61 (8th
Cir. 2007) (explaining the split); infra Section I.C.
21 Compare Goss Int’l, 491 F.3d at 359–61 (placing international comity above other policy
concerns), with Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 926–27 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (reasoning that foreign “parallel proceedings on the same in personam claim should ordinarily be
allowed to proceed simultaneously”), China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33,
36–37 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 917–21) (same), and Daniel Tan, Anti-Suit
Injunctions and the Vexing Problem of Comity, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 283, 303–13 (2005) (arguing that
international comity should play a limited role in foreign antisuit injunction decisions).
22 While courts use the terms “conservative” and “liberal,” referring to their literal meanings rather
than political ideologies, this Note will use “restrictive” and “permissive” instead, which are more
accurate labels for the legal standards.
23 See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 926–27; Walter W. Heiser, Using Anti-Suit Injunctions to Prevent
Interdictory Actions and to Enforce Choice of Court Agreements, 2011 UTAH L. REV.
855, 857–58 (2011).
24 BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 14, at 553 (citing, as examples of the permissive approach in
action, Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 887–89 (9th Cir. 2012); Karaha Bodas Co. v.
Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 335 F.3d 357, 366 (5th Cir. 2003); Kaepa, Inc.
v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 1996); and Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. Nat’l Hockey
League, 652 F.2d 852, 856 (9th Cir. 1981)); Heiser, supra note 23, at 858 (stating that the permissive
approach “places only modest emphasis on international comity and approves the issuance of an anti-suit
injunction when necessary to prevent duplicative and vexatious foreign litigation, and to avoid
inconsistent judgments”).
25 Athina Invs. Ltd. v. Pinchuk, 443 F. Supp. 2d 177, 181–82 (D. Mass. 2006) (finding that “the
Moscow action does not imperil public policies to an extent that would justify an injunction,” in part
because of “the forum’s substantial interest in international comity”).
26 Infra Section I.C.
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inconsistent judgments.27 One concern is how courts’ antisuit injunction
decisions affect whether any of the parallel proceedings settle. A related
issue is whether parallel proceedings end in ways that reflect the merits of
underlying disputes. As the court in Athina acknowledged, some deeppocketed litigants may bring foreign parallel proceedings to pressure
opponents with fewer resources into settlement.28 While courts and scholars
have condemned such devious litigation strategies,29 no previous scholarship
has attempted to measure the connection between international parallel
proceedings and settlement rates—a connection I call the settlement effect.
This Note takes up the task, using foreign antisuit injunction motions as a
lens to test the settlement effect. In a new empirical study of 128 cases, I find
that settlement rates increase significantly after U.S. courts refuse to enjoin
foreign duplicative litigation,30 compared with cases where courts issue
antisuit injunctions.
Part I of this Note lays out the common threats that international parallel
proceedings pose to courts and litigants. Part II focuses on the longstanding
division among federal circuit courts over when to grant foreign antisuit
injunctions. Then, Part III describes my empirical study of the settlement
effect. The results in Part IV show a statistically significant rise in settlement
after foreign antisuit injunction denials—results which should encourage
larger studies on parallel proceedings. Part V returns to Athina, among other
cases, arguing that the permissive approach to foreign antisuit injunctions
strikes an appropriate balance between efficiency and international comity
while reducing potential abuse of judicial resources. This Note concludes
See Tan, supra note 21, at 310 (“[C]ourts seem to condition the amount of respect due to a foreign
court on matters such as the egregiousness of the respondent’s conduct and other considerations unrelated
to the impact an anti-suit injunction has on comity.”); Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc.,
10 F.3d 425, 432–33 (7th Cir. 1993) (“The only concern with international comity is a purely theoretical
one that ought not trump a concrete and persuasive demonstration of harm to the applicant for the
injunction, if it is denied, not offset by any harm to the opponent if it is granted.”); Turner Ent. Co. v.
Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1523 (11th Cir. 1994).
28 See Athina, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 178–79.
29
See Continental Ins. Co. v. Cumberland Trucking Co., 670 F. Supp. 827, 829 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
(“There is no reason why Continental, thoroughly enmeshed in settlement negotiations, should
precipitously file suit on issues before another tribunal. In the absence of any justification for such action,
this court can only conclude that Continental acted in bad faith.”); Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian
World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (discussing the defendants’ apparent motive “to attack
the pending United States action in a foreign court”); Yoshimasa Furuta, International Parallel
Litigation: Disposition of Duplicative Civil Proceedings in the United States and Japan, 5 PAC. RIM L.
& POL’Y J. 1, 5–6 (1995); Michael T. Gibson, Private Concurrent Litigation in Light of Younger,
Pennzoil, and Colorado River, 14 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 185, 196–98 (1989); cf. Martin H. Redish,
Intersystemic Redundancy and Federal Court Power: Proposing a Zero Tolerance Solution to the
Duplicative Litigation Problem, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1353 (2000) (arguing that strategic filing
of domestic duplicative suits “causes significant harm, both to the system and individual litigants”).
30 I use “foreign duplicative litigation” interchangeably with “international parallel proceedings.”
27
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that the permissive approach is more capable of discouraging exploitative
foreign duplicative litigation and deterring unfair settlements.
I.

PROBLEMS WITH INTERNATIONAL PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS

International parallel proceedings occur when adjudicative bodies in
multiple countries exercise jurisdiction over identical, related, or similar
lawsuits.31 When forums in multiple countries are available—offering
different choice of law or procedural rules, and accordingly, different
prospects of victory—battles ensue over which forum should resolve a
dispute.32 The result of a high-stakes “battle of the fora” can be a drastic shift
in the parties’ strategic positions and the probability of settlement.33
Without judicial intervention, international parallel proceedings may
continue simultaneously until judgment. This is undesirable for several
reasons. Section I.A explains how “races to judgment”—a hallmark of
parallel proceedings—are wasteful. Section I.B describes unfair uses of
parallel proceedings, including harassment, circumvention of forum
selection agreements, and settlement pressure. Section I.C then compares the
role of comity in domestic and international parallel proceedings and
suggests that the differences caution against overreliance on international
comity.
A. Wasteful Races to Judgment
Waste is an inevitable side effect of parallel proceedings, and
inconsistent judgments are a considerable risk. No constitutional or federal
statutory law guides U.S. courts presiding over cases with parallel foreign
counterparts.34 By default, international parallel proceedings advance
concurrently, and one court often reaches a final judgment before the other.35
This phenomenon is known as a “race to judgment.”36 In these situations, the

31

See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 14, at 531; Koeninger & Bales, supra note 14, at 475.
Calamita, supra note 16, at 608.
33 Id. at 608–09.
34 BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 14, at 532.
35 Koeninger & Bales, supra note 14, at 475; see also Heiser, supra note 23, at 855 (“The traditional
response by U.S. courts to parallel litigation is to do nothing . . . .”); Colo. River Water Conservation
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (noting the “virtually unflagging obligation of the federal
courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them” over domestic federal-state parallel proceedings,
distinguishing domestic parallel proceedings in two or more federal courts, where avoiding duplicative
litigation is the general rule).
36 Koeninger & Bales, supra note 14, at 475. The phrase “race to judgment” implies a pressure on
the parties or the courts to expedite proceedings. See Kathryn E. Vertigan, Foreign Antisuit Injunctions:
Taking a Lesson from the Act of State Doctrine, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 155, 158 (2007). Courts
32
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enforceability of the faster court’s judgment is uncertain.37 By contrast, in
domestic parallel proceedings—in two state courts or in a state court and a
federal court—the slower court typically has an obligation to recognize the
judgment of the faster court.38 Specifically, the doctrines of res judicata or
collateral estoppel can limit or prevent the slower court from readjudicating
findings of the faster court.39 But international courts presiding over parallel
proceedings may not have similar obligations.
While there is a common law presumption in U.S. courts of recognizing
foreign judgments, standards vary by state and there are a number of
exceptions.40 And because the United States has not signed any international
judgment-recognition agreements, recognition of U.S. judgments abroad is

sometimes enjoin parallel litigation to avoid races to judgment and higher litigation costs. Compare China
Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding the additional expense
of a race to judgment, among other factors, insufficient to warrant an international antisuit injunction),
with Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc. v. Nat’l Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852, 856 (9th Cir. 1981)
(reasoning that an antisuit injunction was proper because allowing international parallel proceedings to
continue “is likely to result in unnecessary delay and substantial inconvenience and expense” and “could
result in inconsistent rulings or even a race to judgment”).
37 See Heiser, supra note 23, at 873 (“[T]here is no international equivalent to the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.”); Koeninger & Bales, supra note 14, at 476 (“[T]he [international] race to judgment is
less effective because the foreign court is under no obligation to adhere to the doctrine of res judicata.”).
Compare Evergreen Marine Corp. v. Welgrow Int’l Inc., 954 F. Supp. 101, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding
that the risk of inconsistent judgments supported staying the case in favor of a foreign parallel
proceeding), with Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 926–27 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (reasoning that international “parallel proceedings on the same in personam claim should
ordinarily be allowed to proceed simultaneously,” assuming that a judgment by one court “can be pled as
res judicata in the other”). For additional commentary on the relationship between foreign judgment
recognition and international parallel proceedings, see Louise Ellen Teitz, Both Sides of the Coin: A
Decade of Parallel Proceedings and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Transnational Litigation,
10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 7–10 (2004) (discussing international approaches to parallel
proceedings and explaining how duplicative litigation and recognition of foreign judgments are
interrelated problems), and Austen L. Parrish, Duplicative Foreign Litigation, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
237, 241–42 (2010) (describing how other countries, such as the United States, have fumbled issues
accompanying international parallel proceedings).
38 Koeninger & Bales, supra note 14, at 475; Heiser, supra note 23, at 873. For domestic parallel
proceedings in two state courts, the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires the slower state court to
recognize the faster state court’s judgment. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; Heiser, supra note 23, at 873.
Similarly, for parallel proceedings in a state court and a federal court, res judicata and Full Faith and
Credit principles typically oblige the same result. Heiser, supra note 23, at 873 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738;
Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508–09 (2001); Marrese v. Am. Acad. of
Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985)).
39 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 17, 24 (AM. L. INST. 1982).
40 See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 14, at 1069–73, 1105–06 (describing varying approaches to
foreign judgment recognition in U.S. courts and reasons U.S. courts might refuse to recognize foreign
judgments); see Yuliya Zeynalova, The Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Is
It Broken and How Do We Fix It?, 31 BERKELEY. J. INT’L L. 150, 154–55 (2013) (explaining that comity
“has produced a pro-recognition attitude in U.S. courts that has carried over to foreign-country judgments
even in the absence of any bilateral or multilateral treaties”).
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even less predictable.41 This uncertainty heightens the risks that parallel
courts will reach inconsistent judgments and that complex and expensive
litigation will continue long after the race to judgment is won.42 Even when
the slower court enforces the faster court’s judgment, the waste of judicial
resources seems inevitable.43 Litigants who aim to delay, harass, or drive up
litigation costs have double the opportunities to do so in the context of
international parallel proceedings.
B. Gamesmanship and Settlement Pressure
Parallel litigation—whether international or domestic—often reeks of
“indefensible gamesmanship, jeopardizing public faith in the judicial
system.”44 There are two kinds of parallel suits: repetitive and reactive.
Repetitive litigation occurs when the plaintiff in case one sues the same
defendant over the same issues in a different forum in case two.45 By contrast,
reactive litigation occurs when the case-one defendant brings case two
against the case-one plaintiff over the same issues in a different forum.46
Allowing plaintiffs to file and pursue repetitive suits in multiple countries

41 See Samuel P. Baumgartner, Understanding the Obstacles to the Recognition and Enforcement of
U.S. Judgments Abroad, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 965, 967 (2013) [hereinafter Baumgartner,
Understanding the Obstacles] (“[T]here are jurisdictions that liberally recognize and enforce U.S.
judgments . . . . At the other end of the spectrum, there are a number of countries where U.S. judgments
are for the most part given no effect. In addition, the prospect of recognizing and enforcing a U.S.
judgment abroad may depend on the domicile or the nationality of the defendant, the subject matter of
the suit, the type of damages awarded, and the way the proceedings leading to the U.S. judgment were
conducted.”); BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 14, at 1074–75 (observing that “the complexity of U.S.
litigation procedures, the size of damage awards, and the nature of U.S. jurisdictional claims” compound
the difficulties of enforcing U.S. judgments abroad); Zeynalova, supra note 40, at 151 (“Enforcing U.S.
court judgments abroad can prove especially difficult in light of divergent rules on jurisdiction,
requirements for special service of process, reciprocity, and some foreign countries’ public policy
concerns over enforcing American jury awards carrying hefty punitive damages.”); see also Samuel P.
Baumgartner, How Well Do U.S. Judgments Fare in Europe?, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 173, 173
(2008) (finding that, “on average, U.S. judgments face more obstacles in Europe than do European
judgments in the United States”).
42 See Vertigan, supra note 36, at 158.
43 Cf. James C. Rehnquist, Taking Comity Seriously: How to Neutralize the Abstention Doctrine,
46 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1064–65 (1994) (describing domestic parallel proceedings as “patently
wasteful”); see Parrish, supra note 37, at 244–45 (“The waste is magnified if the ultimate judgment in
one action renders the other action meaningless.”); Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation:
Rethinking Plaintiff Autonomy and the Court’s Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. PITT. L. REV.
809, 832 (1989) (“Courts are a public resource, providing publicly financed resolution of private disputes.
We pay for them, and we have a right to insist that their services not be squandered.”); Redish, supra note
29, at 1353 (noting that the inefficiencies of parallel litigation “have been dramatically exacerbated by
the litigation explosion of the last generation”).
44 Rehnquist, supra note 43, at 1064.
45 Allan D. Vestal, Repetitive Litigation, 45 IOWA L. REV. 525, 525 (1960).
46 Allan D. Vestal, Reactive Litigation, 47 IOWA L. REV. 11, 11 (1961).
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seems unfair because of the potential for harassment.47 While the motives
driving repetitive suits are various and sometimes unclear, harassment of this
kind can force opponents into settlement or add pressure to ongoing
negotiations.48 “[T]he same aura of gamesmanship surrounds reactive suits”
because litigants can bring them to harass their opponents and raise litigation
costs.49 Nonetheless, reactive litigation may be “slightly more palatable” than
repetitive litigation as a response to forum shopping because the reactive
plaintiff did not choose the first forum and might fairly prefer another.50
Whether repetitive or reactive, however, suits intended to exhaust an
opponent’s limited resources, pressure a favorable settlement, or circumvent
a forum selection agreement can unfairly tilt the scales.51 Accordingly, some
courts consider the motives driving duplicative suits important to the
question of whether parallel proceedings should continue.52 In Continental
Insurance Co. v. Cumberland Trucking Co., for example, the federal district
court abstained from ruling on a reactive suit, in favor of a parallel state court
action, after inferring bad faith because the reactive plaintiff sued during
settlement negotiations.53 Like domestic parallel proceedings, international
parallel proceedings raise concerns of unfairness, gamesmanship, and
settlement pressure—only the stakes may be higher in the international
context due to travel expenses and nonrecyclable litigation costs resulting
from differences in law, language, custom, and procedure.54
47

See Redish, supra note 29, at 1353; Vestal, supra note 45, at 526.
Vestal, supra note 45, at 526; see also Furuta, supra note 29, at 5–6 (observing that coercing a
favorable settlement through duplicative litigation is unfair).
49 Rehnquist, supra note 43, at 1065; see Vestal, supra note 46, at 13–17 (discussing the reasons
defendants file reactive suits and the problems those suits raise).
50 Rehnquist, supra note 43, at 1065; see also Gibson, supra note 29, at 198 (characterizing the
defendant in the first forum as “the party who lost the race to the courthouse,” and arguing that filing
speed should not dictate the forum); David W. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and
England: “A Rather Fantastic Fiction,” 103 LAW Q. REV. 398, 398 (1987) (“[D]efendants in
transnational cases must be empowered to resist plaintiffs’ unwarrantable assertions of jurisdiction.”).
51 See Furuta, supra note 29, at 5–6; Gibson, supra note 29, at 196–98; Flavia Foz Mange, Anti-Suit
Injunctions in International Arbitration: Protecting the Procedure or Pushing the Settlement, 4 DISP.
RESOL. INT’L 191, 206 (2010).
52 Gibson, supra note 29, at 259–60; see Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines,
731 F.2d 909, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting that the defendants had filed the foreign action “for the sole
purpose of terminating the United States claim”); Continental Ins. Co. v. Cumberland Trucking Co.,
670 F. Supp. 827, 829 (N.D. Ill. 1987). But see Athina Invs. Ltd. v. Pinchuk, 443 F. Supp. 2d 177, 181
(D. Mass. 2006) (denying motion for foreign antisuit injunction over plaintiffs’ argument that the reactive
suit intentionally threatened their financial ability to litigate the domestic action).
53 Continental Ins. Co., 670 F. Supp. at 829.
54 See George A. Bermann, The Use of Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Litigation, 28 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 589, 619–20 (1990) (noting further that “most foreign countries cannot be expected . . .
to decline jurisdiction on discretionary grounds such as forum non conveniens and thus themselves police
vexatious or oppressive litigation”).
48
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C. Balancing Comity
Unlike domestic parallel proceedings, international parallel
proceedings can implicate foreign relations. For example, a U.S. court may
worry that deciding a case or enjoining parallel litigation in a foreign forum
will insult the foreign sovereign or provoke retaliation.55 While both
domestic and foreign antisuit injunctions require consideration of comity,
comparing its role in domestic and international parallel proceedings urges
against overreliance on comity in the international context.
The term “international comity” is difficult to define—let alone balance
against competing interests.56 U.S. courts have not only defined “comity”
uniquely but leaned on the concept more heavily than any other legal
system.57 In 1895, the Supreme Court described “comity” in Hilton v. Guyot
as
neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy
and good will, upon the other. But [comity] is the recognition which one nation
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another
nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the
rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its
laws.58

Since Hilton, comity’s use in the United States has expanded toward
facilitating predictability to support international commerce, maintaining the
separate foreign-relations authority of the political branches, fostering
55 See, e.g., Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 937–45 (“[C]omity serves our international system like the
mortar which cements together a brick house. No one would willingly permit the mortar to crumble or be
chipped away for fear of compromising the entire structure. . . . [C]omity compels national courts to act
at all times to increase the international legal ties that advance the rule of law within and among nations.”);
see also Bermann, supra note 54, at 606 (observing that “anti-suit injunctions [both] find their greatest
utility in the international setting” and “have their greatest capacity for mischief”); infra Part II
(discussing international comity’s role in decisions on foreign antisuit injunction motions).
56 See Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 55 (1991) (“The rhetoric of
comity generally refers to all or some of three objectives: avoiding interference with the conduct of
foreign relations by the political branches; facilitating international transactions by making the outcome
of such cases more predictable in terms of governing law or choice of forum; and encouraging foreign
courts to accord reciprocal respect to the law of the United States.”); Calamita, supra note 16, at 614–15
(distinguishing “prescriptive comity” from “adjudicatory comity”); see also Thomas Schultz & Niccolò
Ridi, Comity in US Courts, 10 NE. U. L. REV. 280, 287–88 (2018) (observing that comity “seems to have
countless meanings”).
57 Schultz & Ridi, supra note 56, at 282–88, 354–55, 363–65 (exploring the roots and transformation
of comity in American law and showing that American comity is unique in “the sheer number of doctrines
and rules” which it influences).
58 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895); see HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN
UNITED STATES COURTS 19–20 (2008) (noting the expansion of comity in the United States after Hilton
by which courts have applied comity “not simply to defer to, but also to recognize and enforce
domestically, the decisions of foreign sovereigns and courts”).
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reciprocity, and preventing retaliation by foreign nations.59 In Laker Airways
v. Sabena, for instance, the D.C. circuit court expressed fear that ordering a
party to cease foreign litigation might inspire the foreign court to issue a
mirror-image order, leaving the parties without a forum.60 More recently,
Professor William Dodge considered comity’s various uses by U.S. courts
and distilled its meaning to “deference to foreign government actors that is
not required by international law but is incorporated in domestic law.”61
Many scholars have argued that international comity should play a
significant role in U.S. courts’ treatment of international parallel
proceedings.62 Specifically, comity may promote predictability in dispute
resolution63 and avoid retaliation.64 Comity enthusiasts have also lauded the

59 See Paul, supra note 56, at 55; see also Turner Ent. Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1519
n.10 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[H]ighlighting the vague meaning of international comity, [it] has been defined
in various places as ‘the basis of international law, a rule of international law, a synonym for private
international law, a rule of choice of law, courtesy, politeness, convenience or goodwill between
sovereigns, a moral necessity, expediency, reciprocity or “consideration of high international politics
concerned with maintaining amicable and workable relationships between nations.”’” (quoting Paul,
supra note 56, at 3–4 & nn.4–14)).
60 Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 927 (“[Antisuit injunctions] effectively restrict the foreign court’s
ability to exercise its jurisdiction. If the foreign court reacts with a similar injunction, no party may be
able to obtain any remedy.”).
61 William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2079
(2015).
62 See Calamita, supra note 16, at 605 (contending that comity “provides the key for the Supreme
Court and other federal courts to deal dynamically with international parallel proceedings”); Steven R.
Swanson, The Vexatiousness of a Vexation Rule: International Comity and Antisuit Injunctions, 30 GEO.
WASH. J. INT’L L. ECON. 1, 36 (1996) (“[C]omity . . . requires consideration of the practical needs of the
forum state and the international system in creating a smoothly functioning mechanism for dispute
resolution. This goal has become increasingly important as the world becomes more interconnected.”);
Parrish, supra note 37, at 277 (“[C]omity is a way that nation-states surrender a small degree of
sovereignty in the short term to restore control lost to external forces over the long term.”); Robert Wai,
Transnational Liftoff and Juridicial Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of Private International Law
in an Era of Globalization, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 209, 248 (2002) (“[A] broader sense of comity
by U.S. courts might assist regulatory purposes by permitting recognition of progressive public regulation
statutes of foreign jurisdictions.”); Bermann, supra note 54, at 608 (“[T]he equitable nature of the [antisuit
injunction] renders it an especially appropriate subject of the special consideration and reserve evoked by
the notion of international comity.”); Vertigan, supra note 36, at 160 (arguing that enjoining foreign
parallel litigation may insult foreign courts and inspire retaliation); Haig Najarian, Note, Granting Comity
Its Due: A Proposal to Revive the Comity-Based Approach to Transnational Antisuit Injunctions, 68 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 961, 973–74 (1994) (arguing that requiring “an affirmative showing that foreign relations
will somehow be adversely affected” before denying a foreign antisuit injunction motion “gives short
shrift to the authority that established comity as a guiding principle of American jurisprudence”).
63 See Swanson, supra note 62, at 36.
64 See Wai, supra note 62, at 248; Vertigan, supra note 36, at 160.
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doctrine’s history65 and flexibility.66 But the point is controversial. According
to its critics, comity’s vagueness obscures potential clashes between foreign
and domestic policy, underenforces the latter, and encourages results-based
decisions—all of which create unpredictability for litigants.67 Professor
Dodge has provided clarity to comity’s meaning and shown that, in some
contexts, courts have fashioned comity into rules as opposed to nebulous
standards.68 Yet, he acknowledges that comity’s use in antisuit injunction
decisions is discretionary.69 So, in deciding antisuit injunctions at least,
deferring to the ambiguous notion of comity is troubling because it can
prevent courts from considering the actual harms of duplicative litigation.
U.S. courts also invoke comity in the context of domestic parallel
proceedings.70 Comparing comity’s role in international and domestic
parallel proceedings reveals problems with its use in the international
context. For example, the Laker Airways court assumed that comity should
play a similar role in international and domestic parallel proceedings but
should weigh more heavily in federal courts’ decisions whether to enjoin
65

See Parrish, supra note 37, at 277; Najarian, supra note 62, at 973.
See Calamita, supra note 16, at 605; Bermann, supra note 54, at 608; see also Schultz & Ridi,
supra note 56, at 300 (“[C]omity[] is ‘flexible’ because it takes different shapes depending on the goals
states need to accomplish.”); Dodge, supra note 61, at 2131 (observing that the flexible use of comity in
the private-interest context may allow courts to promote fairness and “police abusive litigation tactics”).
67 See Michael D. Ramsey, Escaping “International Comity,” 83 IOWA L. REV. 893, 893–94 (1998)
(“‘International comity’ is frequently invoked by courts but rarely defined with precision. . . . [It]
inevitably invites intuitive adjudication, and hence litigation-inspiring ex ante unpredictability.”); Paul,
supra note 56, at 77 (concluding that “by blurring the lines that divide domestic and international law and
policy . . . , comity obscures the underlying policy conflict without necessarily insuring reciprocal respect
for domestic law, facilitating international commerce, or avoiding interference with foreign relations”);
see also Gardner, supra note 16, at 2310–11 (explaining how courts have confused distinct lines of
international comity precedent, fostering a concerning degree of judicial discretion in transnational
disputes); Tan, supra note 21, at 303–13 (criticizing unprincipled balancing of comity against unrelated
policy concerns and proposing a limited use of comity in antisuit injunction decisions); Louise Weinberg,
Against Comity, 80 GEO. L.J. 53, 55 (1991) (arguing that comity “is discriminatory and substantively
damaging to the rule of law”).
68 Dodge, supra note 61, at 2078, 2125–30 (explaining that comity has taken a “rule-like” shape in
foreign sovereign immunity doctrine, for example).
69 Id. at 2130 (recognizing that standards have “clearly predominate[d] over rules” with respect to
foreign antisuit injunction and forum non conveniens doctrines). Notably, a unanimous Supreme Court
opinion in Animal Science Products v. Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical reversed the Second Circuit for
giving blanket deference to a foreign government’s construction of its own law, emphasizing that the
“appropriate weight” of international comity “will depend upon the circumstances.” 138 S. Ct. 1865,
1869, 1873 (2018). “Given the world’s many and diverse legal systems,” the Court explained, “no single
formula or rule will fit all cases.” Id. at 1873. Although Animal Science discusses international comity as
a discretionary tool in a different context, the Court’s reasoning should also urge against unconsidered
reliance on discretionary comity in antisuit injunction decisions. See id.
70 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
544 U.S. 280, 282 (2005) (citing Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800
(1976)); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 (1987).
66
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international parallel proceedings.71 Of course, foreign nations may be more
sensitive to intrusive judicial decisions than domestic states. Yet, contextual
differences between domestic and international parallel proceedings suggest
that deference to foreign courts can compromise U.S. interests in ways that
deference to state courts would not.
Principal among these differences is that state courts have a
constitutional duty, per the Supremacy Clause, to uphold federal law.72
Foreign courts do not. And when federal courts defer to state court
proceedings, the possibility of Supreme Court review of state courts’
decisions on federal law remains open.73 In contrast, the Supreme Court
cannot directly review the decisions of any foreign courts. Additionally,
domestic federal and state courts are theoretically in parity,74 whereas foreign
courts are not fungible with any U.S. courts. Further, by enacting the antiinjunction statute, Congress has limited the circumstances in which federal

71 See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 927 n.52 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (“[S]trong policies of comity and mutual respect . . . limit the discretion of courts to interfere with
concurrent proceedings. These policies, which find such compelling expression in ordering the
intranational affairs of our dual court system, apply a fortiori to injunctions affecting the exercise of
jurisdiction in foreign countries.” (citing Canadian Filters (Harwich) Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 412 F.2d
577, 578 (1st Cir. 1969))); see also Gardner, supra note 16, at 2333 (observing that federal courts’ varying
uses of international comity to deal with international parallel proceedings “all start from an analogy to
the treatment of federal-state parallel litigation”).
72 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (mandating that the “Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . .
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby”). Similarly,
the Full Faith and Credit Clause and statute require mutual recognition of domestic judgments. See U.S.
Const. art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738; supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
73 See Martin H. Redish, Supreme Court Review of State Court “Federal” Decisions: A Study in
Interactive Federalism, 19 GA. L. REV. 861, 899–904 (1985) (discussing the Supreme Court’s authority
to review state court decisions).
74 See Rehnquist, supra note 43, at 1055 (“[A]bsent direction from Congress, federal and state courts
are properly seen as functional equivalents comprising a single national system.”). But see Burt Neuborne,
The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105–06 (1977) (arguing that state courts “are less likely to
be receptive to vigorous enforcement of federal constitutional doctrine”); Martin H. Redish, Judicial
Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Comment on Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional
Rights, 36 UCLA L. REV. 329, 335 (1988) (“[T]he absence of prophylactic protections of state judicial
salary and tenure is so inconsistent with concepts of basic fairness as to violate procedural due process.”);
Akhil Reed Amar, Parity as a Constitutional Question, 71 B.U. L. REV. 645, 646 (1991) (arguing that the
Constitution presumes “disparity between federal and state courts—at least where the question is which
court may be given the last word on issues of federal law”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity
Debate, 71 B.U. L. REV. 593, 600 (1991) (“A meaningful approach to federal jurisdiction must transcend
the focus on parity.”). For a call to refocus the parity conversation on empirically measurable criteria to
improve the performance of both court systems—rather than determine which court system is better—
see Meredith R. Aska McBride, Parity as Comparative Capacity: A New Empirics of the Parity Debate,
90 U. CIN. L. REV. 68, 69–72 (2021).
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courts may enjoin state court proceedings.75 No such statute limits the
authority of federal courts to enjoin foreign proceedings.76 These differences
all suggest that deference to foreign courts undermines the United States’
interests in enforcing U.S. law and adjudicating disputes Congress has
determined fit for resolution by federal courts to a greater extent than would
deference to state courts.77
Of course, many cases belong in foreign tribunals,78 and I do not suggest
that antisuit injunctions are a better remedy to parallel litigation than
abstention. The choice is case-specific. Still, two forums are not better than
one, and courts’ options to consolidate parallel proceedings depend on the
motions before them. When courts must choose between enjoining
international parallel proceedings and doing nothing, the comity reflex—
without evidence of potential harm to foreign relations—risks unfairness and
inefficiency by ignoring more immediate dangers to litigants.
Naturally, the United States’ interests in dispute resolution and policy
enforcement vary: not every case with a foreign parallel counterpart is likely
to blow up into “a full-scale diplomatic episode” as Laker Airways did.79
Such variance should counsel against prophylactic reliance on international
comity. So long as foreign antisuit injunctions remain in U.S. courts’
toolboxes, some comity infringement may be unavoidable.80 Courts will
75

See 28 U.S.C. § 2283; see also Redish, The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris: Deference in Search
of a Rationale, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 463, 484–85 (1978) (explaining that the anti-injunction statute’s
historical development influenced the Supreme Court’s creation of comity-based abstention in Younger).
76 See supra Section I.A.
77 See Ramsey, supra note 67, at 906–31 (explaining the doctrinal limits of extraterritorial application
of U.S. law and arguing that comity’s vagueness leads to “ad hoc judicial policymaking”); Weinberg,
supra note 67, at 55; see also Elliott E. Cheatham & Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law,
52 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 961 (1952) (“[A] court must follow the dictates of its own legislature to the
extent that these are constitutional.”); see also Paul, supra note 56, at 75–76 (observing that the
Constitution divides foreign-relations power between Congress and the Executive Branch, while “courts
are neither constitutionally competent to rewrite legislation, nor equipped to negotiate political disputes”);
Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, the Proposed Hague Convention and Progress in
National Law, 49 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 203, 213 (2001) (calling the use of doctrine originating in domestic
parallel proceedings in international parallel proceedings “indefensible”). Discussing abstention in favor
of foreign parallel proceedings, Professor Gardner has argued that separation-of-powers concerns are
greater in the context of international parallel proceedings than federal-state domestic parallel
proceedings because “state courts operate within the same common law context as the federal courts and
are bound by the same constitutional and federal statutory constraints.” Gardner, supra note 16, at 2334.
78 See Robertson, supra note 50, at 398.
79 Bermann, supra note 54, at 608 n.75 (citing Stuart Auerbach, Jury Probe of Airlines Called Off,
WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 1984), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1984/11/20/jury-probeof-airlines-called-off/e6738a3c-f3b5-4066-bb7c-26b4ef3377d0 [https://perma.cc/7KPY-Q4M2]).
80 See Tan, supra note 21, at 312 (“Unless the United States courts . . . give up the anti-suit injunction
remedy altogether, they must not simply place the crude concept of comity statically on one end of the
scales to be balanced against other considerations, especially since there are hardly any guidelines on how
to perform this balancing exercise.”).
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nevertheless foster predictability by expecting litigants to articulate precise
foreign-relations concerns before giving international comity more weight
than efficiency and fairness.
*

*

*

In sum, international parallel proceedings waste courts’ and litigants’
resources and can create inconsistent judgments. Further, parties can exploit
international parallel proceedings to harass opponents and exert settlement
pressure. International comity has proven difficult for courts to define and
apply in disputes over international parallel proceedings—a problem the next
section will explore further in the context of foreign antisuit injunction
motions.81 In trying to measure the settlement effect,82 this Note discovers the
first empirical evidence of a significant rise in settlement after courts allowed
foreign duplicative litigation to continue.83
II. FOREIGN ANTISUIT INJUNCTIONS: A SPLIT OVER
INTERNATIONAL COMITY
The desire for certainty, efficiency, fairness, convenience, or deference
to a foreign sovereign may motivate a court to end an international race
before a final judgment.84 Likewise, parties to international parallel
proceedings often prefer exclusive litigation in a single forum for similar
reasons, including the expense of duplicative litigation, the risk of
inconsistent judgments, or the application of different and unfavorable law.85
A few common law remedies that consolidate foreign duplicative litigation
are available to U.S. courts: antisuit injunctions, lis alibi pendens stays, and
forum non conveniens dismissals.86

81

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
83 See infra Part IV.
84 See, e.g., Turner Ent. Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1523 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding
that “international comity, fairness and efficiency point[ed] overwhelmingly” toward international
abstention); see also Heiser, supra note 23, at 855 (noting exceptions to the practice of allowing
international parallel proceedings to continue).
85 Teresa D. Baer, Injunctions Against the Prosecution of Litigation Abroad: Towards a
Transnational Approach, 37 STAN L. REV. 155, 155 (1984); see BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 14, at
531. Of course, some litigants may hope to maintain multiple lawsuits in international forums to harass
their opponents or gain an advantage through exhaustion of their opponents’ resources. See Vertigan,
supra note 36, at 157.
86 See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 14, at 532; supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text.
82

1592

116:1577 (2022)

Foreign Antisuit Injunctions and the Settlement Effect

U.S. courts have broad authority to compel behavior of parties over
whom they have personal jurisdiction—notwithstanding national borders.87
This includes the power to issue foreign antisuit injunctions ordering a party
not to litigate proceedings in a foreign forum.88 Generally, U.S. federal courts
agree that a foreign antisuit injunction motion must satisfy two threshold
requirements: (1) the parties and issues in the parallel proceedings must be
the same; and (2) the present case’s resolution must be dispositive of the
foreign case.89
While the equitable power of a court to enjoin litigation abroad does not
directly implicate foreign sovereignty,90 most U.S. courts recognize that
antisuit injunctions “effectively restrict the foreign court’s ability to exercise
its jurisdiction.”91 Therefore, because of the ambiguous force of international

87 BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 14, at 551 n.34. But see Bermann, supra note 54, at 604–05
(suggesting that “[j]udicial interference with a foreign country’s exercise of adjudicatory authority has a
potential for embarrassing the political branches of government” although conceding that “no federal case
[has] categorically reject[ed] international anti-suit injunctions on separation of powers grounds”).
88 BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 14, at 551–52, 560; see Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 116–
19 (1890) (describing the “well settled” equitable power of U.S. courts—with roots in English common
law—to control behavior of litigants abroad); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84 cmt. h
(AM. L. INST. 1971) (explaining that “a court may enjoin a person over whom it has personal jurisdiction
from bringing suit in . . . an inappropriate forum,” although such injunctions are only appropriate “in
extreme circumstances”); see also W. Elec. Co. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 450 F. Supp. 835, 837 (S.D. Fla.
1978) (noting that a U.S. court “has the power to enjoin a party over whom it has personal jurisdiction
from pursuing litigation before a foreign tribunal”). For a historical discussion of antisuit injunctions,
their origins in English common law courts, subsequent use in domestic parallel proceedings in both Great
Britain and the United States, and the eventual adoption of antisuit injunction doctrine into the context of
international parallel proceedings, see Bermann, supra note 54, at 593–604.
89 Heiser, supra note 23, at 857. But see MWK Recruiting Inc. v. Jowers, 833 F. App’x 560, 564–65
(5th Cir. 2020) (distinguishing Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 430–31 (7th
Cir. 1993)), which discusses the first threshold requirement, rejects the more flexible logical-relationship
test, and requires instead that parallel cases involve identical claims or the same or similar legal bases.
See also Tan, supra note 21, at 313–23 (exploring variation in the second threshold requirement).
90 See Ernest J. Messner, The Jurisdiction of a Court of Equity over Persons to Compel the Doing of
Acts Outside the Territorial Limits of the State, 14 MINN. L. REV. 494, 495–96 (1930) (reasoning that
court orders controlling behavior of parties abroad do not direct proceedings of a foreign court, and
accordingly, do not implicate the foreign court’s sovereignty).
91 Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1984); BORN
& RUTLEDGE, supra note 14, at 552; see China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33,
35–36 (2d Cir. 1987) (reasoning that “an anti-foreign-suit injunction should be ‘used sparingly’” and
granted “only with care and great restraint” in consideration of international comity, even if “the
injunction operates only against the parties, and not directly against the foreign court” (first quoting
United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1038 (2d Cir. 1985); and then quoting Canadian Filters (Harwich)
Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 412 F.2d 577, 578 (1st Cir. 1969))); cf. Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S.
408, 413 (1964) (“[T]hat an injunction issues only to the parties before the court, and not to the court, is
no evasion of the difficulties that are the necessary result of an attempt to exercise that power over a party
who is a litigant in another and independent forum.” (quoting Peck v. Jenness, 48 U.S. 612, 625 (1849))).
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comity,92 lower courts have split over the legal standard applicable to foreign
antisuit injunctions beyond the threshold requirements.93
The restrictive approach—which reigns in the First, Second, Third,
Sixth, Eighth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits—wields
international comity with fervor, strongly disfavoring foreign antisuit
injunctions.94 The restrictive presumption against foreign antisuit injunctions
will give way only where (1) a foreign case threatens a U.S. court’s
jurisdiction or an important public policy; and (2) domestic interests
outweigh prophylactic international-comity concerns.95 While there is some
divergence among the restrictive circuits on when antisuit injunctions are
appropriate, “duplication of parties and issues alone is not sufficient.”96
The permissive approach, by contrast, values efficiency over comity. In
the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, foreign parallel litigation with the
same parties and issues will generally justify a foreign antisuit injunction.97
For permissive circuits, international comity takes a back seat to concerns of
avoiding waste, inconvenience, delay, vexation, and inconsistent
judgments—all of which often accompany duplicative litigation.98
92

See supra Section I.C; Heiser, supra note 23, at 858.
See Goss Int’l Corp. v. Man Roland Druckmaschinen Aktiengesellschaft, 491 F.3d 355, 359–61
(8th Cir. 2007) (explaining the circuit split and joining the dominant restrictive approach).
94 See Heiser, supra note 23, at 857–58. The Eleventh Circuit has endorsed, but not adopted, the
restrictive approach. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 14, at 553 (citing Canon Latin Am., Inc. v. Lantech
(CR), S.A., 508 F.3d 597 (11th Cir. 2007)).
95 Heiser, supra note 23, at 857–58 (citing Goss Int’l, 491 F.3d at 359–60); Quaak v. Klynveld Peat
Marwick Goerdeler Bedrijfsrevisoren, 361 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 2004); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Deutz AG,
270 F.3d 144, 161 (3d Cir. 2001); Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Tr. Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1355 (6th Cir. 1992);
China Trade, 837 F.2d at 35–37).
96 Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 928–29; see BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 14, at 552–53 (pointing
out subtle variations among the restrictive circuits). The First Circuit, for example, rejected the permissive
approach outright, then—reasoning that “comity, like beauty, sometimes is in the eye of the beholder”—
adopted a more flexible spin on the restrictive approach. Quaak, 361 F.3d at 17–19.
97 BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 14, at 553 (citing Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola Inc., 696 F.3d 872,
887–89 (9th Cir. 2012)); see Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi
Negara, 335 F.3d 357, 366 (5th Cir. 2003); Seattle Totems Hockey Club v. Nat’l Hockey League,
652 F.2d 852, 856 (9th Cir. 1981). The Seventh Circuit has favored this “laxer” approach without
adopting it outright. See 1st Source Bank v. Neto, 861 F.3d 607, 613 n.2 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Allendale
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 431 (7th Cir. 1993)); Phillips Med. Sys. Int’l v.
Bruetman, 8 F.3d 600, 605 (7th Cir. 1993). The Fourth Circuit, which has seen few cases with foreign
parallel counterparts, has not yet picked a side. See BAE Sys. Tech. Sol. & Servs., Inc. v. Republic of
Korea’s Def. Acquisition Program, 884 F.3d 463, 479–80 (4th Cir. 2018) (affirming the denial of a
foreign antisuit injunction without deciding between the permissive and restrictive approaches); Custom
Polymers PET, LLC v. Gamma Meccanica Spa, 185 F. Supp. 3d 741, 757–61 (D.S.C. 2016) (applying
both approaches).
98 See Heiser, supra note 23, at 858; Microsoft Corp., 696 F.3d at 886; H-D Michigan, LLC v.
Hellenic Duty Free Shops S.A., 694 F.3d 827, 848 (7th Cir. 2012); Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d
93
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Put simply, the restrictive and permissive approaches divide over how
to weigh international comity. Restrictive circuits place the burden on
foreign antisuit injunction movants to overcome a strong presumption that
enjoining parallel litigation will infringe comity.99 Permissive circuits, by
contrast, require parties opposing foreign antisuit injunctions to demonstrate
that the dangers of infringing international comity outweigh efficiency and
fairness.100 As the above discussion of international comity suggests, the
permissive approach is preferable considering the awkwardness of
transplanting comity from domestic to international parallel proceedings,
varying foreign-relations concerns among international disputes, and the
difficulty of balancing comity against more concrete policy concerns.101
The following Parts attempt to measure the relationship between
settlement rates and foreign antisuit injunction denials, finding early
evidence of a positive correlation.102 Larger studies remain necessary to
confirm the existence of the settlement effect and determine whether its
cause is the expense of international parallel proceedings. Meanwhile, this
Note relies on case studies to argue that the permissive approach is more
capable of preventing parties from exerting unfair settlement pressure.103
III. TESTING THE SETTLEMENT EFFECT
Driving this study is the hypothesis that when U.S. courts deny antisuit
injunction motions, settlement rates will rise. Because parallel proceedings
are especially expensive when the forums are in different countries—
requiring higher travel expenses and attorneys’ fees104—the costs of foreign
624, 627 (5th Cir. 1996). For a criticism that the liberal approach “ignores comity,” see Swanson, supra
note 62, at 33–37 (1996). But see Tan, supra note 21, at 301–12 (observing the difficulty of balancing
comity against conflicting equitable factors).
99 See supra notes 93–96 and accompanying text.
100 See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text.
101 See supra Section I.C.
102 See infra Parts III, IV.
103 While I focus on U.S. courts’ decisions on motions to enjoin foreign proceedings to measure the
connection between international parallel proceedings and settlement, and I reach a normative conclusion
that U.S. courts should apply a permissive standard to these motions, I do not suggest that U.S.
proceedings should have priority over foreign proceedings. Nor do I assume that foreign proceedings are
more likely to be filed with harassing intent than U.S. proceedings. Rather, since litigating in U.S. courts
is more expensive than in any other country, the opposite could be true. And a mirror-image study—
focusing on motions to stay U.S. proceedings in favor of foreign proceedings—might find a more extreme
rise in settlement after denial.
104 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. While in most of the United States litigants pay their
own attorneys’ fees regardless of the outcome, many countries outside the United States require the losing
party to pay the winner’s attorneys’ fees, which could affect litigation costs and incentives. See Theodore
Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the American Rule on Attorney Fees: An Empirical
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duplicative litigation allow coercion of favorable settlements.105 And the
influence of litigation costs on litigation strategy may be at its strongest when
one of the courts presiding over international parallel proceedings is in the
United States, home of the world’s highest litigation costs.106
While the impact of international parallel proceedings on settlement has
inspired criticism,107 no previous scholarship has measured the settlement
effect.108 In testing the connection between foreign duplicative litigation and
settlement, this Note does not assume that a high settlement rate is an evil in
itself.109 To the contrary, settlement offers a fast and efficient end to many

Study on Public Company Contracts, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 328–29 (2013). For example, the English
loser-pays rule heightens risk and tends to encourage greater expenses in court. Id. at 341. Otherwise,
there are conflicting theories and few empirical studies on how attorneys’-fees rules affect litigation
strategy. Id. at 334–41; see also Yun-chien Chang & Daniel Klerman, Settlement Around the World:
Settlement Rates in the Largest Economies 21–23 (U.S.C. Gould Sch. of L. Ctr. for L. & Soc. Sci., Legal
Studies Research Paper Series No. 21-8, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=3793078 [https://perma.cc/
7CUC-26AE] (comparing settlement rates in seventeen loser-pays countries with those of three countries
without fee shifting and finding “weak” evidence of a higher settlement rate in the non-fee-shifting
countries).
105 See Vestal, supra note 45, at 526 (“If actions are brought in a number of jurisdictions, the
defendant is forced to hire additional attorneys and spend more time in handling the numerous law
suits.”).
106 See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF LITIGATION
COSTS: CANADA, EUROPE, JAPAN, AND THE UNITED STATES 2, 3, 6 (2013), https://instituteforlegalreform.
com/wp-content/uploads/media/ILR_NERA_Study_International_Liability_Costs-update.pdf [https://
perma.cc/R5CJ-BUD6] (measuring general liability insurance costs of companies in the United States,
Europe, and Canada to conclude that the United States has by far “the highest estimated liability costs in
proportion to GDP”); LAWS. FOR CIV. JUST., CIV. JUST. REFORM GRP. & U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL
REFORM, LITIGATION COST SURVEY OF MAJOR COMPANIES 3 (2010), https://www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/litigation_cost_survey_of_major_companies_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZT9B-MPAZ]
(“[M]ulti-national company respondents to the survey spend a disproportionate amount on litigation in
the United States relative to their expenditures in foreign jurisdictions. Depending on the year, relative
U.S. costs were between four and nine times higher than non-U.S. costs (as a percent of revenue).”); see
also Chang & Klerman, supra note 104, at 20–21 (comparing settlement rates of twenty countries and
finding, on average, higher settlement rates in countries with high litigation costs).
107 See supra Section I.B.
108 Settlement effect refers to the impact on the settlement rate of a court’s decision to allow parallel
proceedings to continue.
109 Full discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of settlement is beyond the scope of this Note.
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disputes,110 and the U.S. legal system promotes it accordingly.111
Nonetheless, a higher settlement rate in the context of international parallel
proceedings, after efforts to consolidate proceedings have failed, could
suggest that the potential for gamesmanship and waste unfairly advantages
parties with deeper pockets. So the settlement effect should interest courts
deciding motions to enjoin foreign duplicative litigation.
This study charts a path toward measuring the settlement effect by
observing how often cases settled after federal district courts denied foreign
antisuit injunction motions. The study codes additional factors with the
potential to impact settlement rates, acknowledging the unavailability of data
on other possibly impactful variables. Hypothesizing that parallel
proceedings tend to force parties to settle, I expect the settlement rate to be
higher among cases where courts have denied relief. Because of this study’s
limitations—including possible selection bias and a lack of data on
potentially influential variables—the results cannot support causal
inferences about international parallel proceedings and settlement. But
finding a higher settlement rate after antisuit injunction denials at least shows
that this area deserves greater empirical attention. Future studies of parallel

110

See Jeffrey R. Seul, Settling Significant Cases, 79 WASH. L. REV. 881, 886 (2004) (arguing that
“negotiation should be viewed as a credible alternative to litigation for resolving disputes that raise
important public policy questions”); Timothy Schnabel, The Singapore Convention on Mediation: A
Framework for the Cross-Border Recognition and Enforcement of Mediated Settlements, 19 PEPP. DISP.
RESOL. L.J. 1, 2 (2019) (explaining that the “primary goal of the [Singapore] Convention is to promote
[mediated settlement]” because it is “a faster, less expensive form of dispute resolution” that is “more
likely to preserve commercial relationships”); see also Jules Coleman & Charles Silver, Justice in
Settlements, 4 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 102, 102–03 (1986) (“Most lawyers, judges, and law professors think
it is good that so few cases are tried. . . . [because] settlements conserve resources and enable parties to
resolve their differences amicably.”). But see Owen M. Fisk, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075
(1984) (arguing that settlement is “a highly problematic technique for streamlining dockets”); Ezra
Friedman & Abraham L. Wickelgreen, No Free Lunch: How Settlement Can Reduce the Legal System’s
Ability to Induce Efficient Behavior, 61 S.M.U. L. REV. 1355, 1356 (2008) (“[T]o make an appropriate
judgment as to the wisdom of promoting settlement, one must not simply look at how settlement reduces
legal costs and delay, but also examine how it affects the legal system’s ability to regulate behavior.”).
111 See W. Whitaker Rayner, Note, Judicial Authority in the Settlement of Federal Civil Cases,
42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 171, 172 (1985); see also Yun-chien Chang & William H.J. Hubbard, Speedy
Adjudication in Hard Cases and Low Settlement Rates in Easy Cases: An Empirical Analysis of
Taiwanese Courts with Comparison to US Federal Courts, in SELECTION AND DECISION IN JUDICIAL
PROCESS AROUND THE WORLD: EMPIRICAL INQUIRIES 77 (Yun-chien Chang ed., 2020) (“To many
American lawyers and judges, efficiency means more settlements and case dispositions (such as summary
judgment) that avoid the tremendous expense of trial.”). For an argument that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure may distort the relationship between case merits and settlement, see J. Maria Glover, The
Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713, 1716 (2012). And see Brooke D. Coleman,
The Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1777, 1821–23 (2015), which suggests that the civil litigation
system has focused on reducing costs at the expense of true efficiency. As a result, Professor Coleman
argues, public adjudication has decreased, resulting in the de-democratization of law and unequal access
to justice. Id.
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proceedings should aim to rule out alternative explanations and determine
whether the settlement effect holds across a larger sample.
After Section III.A discusses how I compiled my sample, Section III.B
explains how the unavailability of some cases with international parallel
proceedings could have skewed the results. Section III.C provides my
definition of “settlement” and my process for coding cases as settled. And
Section III.D describes how I coded independent variables.
D. Sample
I created an original sample of publicly available cases where federal
district courts issued decisions on foreign antisuit injunction motions.112 A
search for “anti-suit or antisuit & injunction” yielded 462 district court
decisions from January 1, 2000 through December 31, 2020 on Westlaw,113
and 461 from the same time period on Lexis. Using the same search criteria,
Westlaw’s “WestSearch” tool produced 104 results—some of which
overlapped with results from its default search function.114 By searching for
“international or foreign” within all Westlaw and Lexis results, I narrowed
the list to 375 opinions on Westlaw, ninety-two on WestSearch, and 377 on
Lexis. Of these, 128 cases were usable datapoints—decisions by federal
district courts on foreign antisuit injunction motions.115 Most of the unusable

112

By using two legal databases, Westlaw and Lexis, I sought to mitigate the potential for one
database’s unique algorithm to bias the sample. See Susan Nevelow Mart, The Algorithm as a Human
Artifact: Implications for Legal [Re]Search, 109 LAW LIBR. J. 387, 420 (2017) (“[E]very algorithm starts
with a different set of biases and assumptions.”); Susan Nevelow Mart, Results May Vary: Which
Database a Researcher Uses Makes a Difference, 104 A.B.A. J. 48, 52–53 (2018) (studying differences
between databases and stating, “[a]s a matter of empirical fact, . . . that Westlaw and Lexis Advance return
more relevant and unique results”). But see Brian N. Lizotte, Publish or Perish: The Electronic
Availability of Summary Judgments by Eight District Courts, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 107, 134 (finding that
“Lexis and Westlaw were highly consistent in the cases they reported”).
113 All searches were performed or replicated on September 17, 2021, or November 19, 2021. Since
Westlaw and Lexis update their databases, readers who repeat the searches may get different results.
Records of search results are on file with the Northwestern University Law Review.
114 The WestSearch feature “includes documents with concepts related to [search] terms for more
thorough research.” See WestSearch: The World’s Most Advanced Legal Search Engine, WESTLAW,
https://web.archive.org/web/20210903063110/http://info.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/pdf/wln2/l355700_v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/95LS-6JPP] (explaining WestSearch).
115 See infra Table A1 (detailing the 128 cases selected). This study’s sample is larger than the two
existing empirical projects involving foreign antisuit injunctions. See Laura Eddleman Heim, Protecting
Their Own?: Pro-American Bias and the Issuance of Anti-Suit Injunctions, 69 OHIO STATE L.J. 701, 719–
20, 733–34 (2008) (analyzing thirty antisuit injunction decisions between 1999 and 2008); Margarita
Treviño de Coale, Stay, Dismiss, Enjoin, or Abstain?: A Survey, 17 B.U. INT’L L.J. 79, 94–96, 112 (1999)
(surveying eighty-two cases involving international parallel proceedings from 1980 to 1999). I excluded
bankruptcy court decisions, which rely on a different body of law. See Heim, supra note 115, at 710 n.48.
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opinions involve domestic parallel proceedings or discuss earlier foreign
antisuit injunction decisions. Some cases were open or pending appeal.116
To check that my search terms did not miss relevant results, I ran
additional searches on each database for “anti-suit or antisuit & enjoin! %
injunctions,” finding no new usable cases. I also filtered a search for “antisuit or antisuit & injunction or enjoin!” by results including terms associated
with names of countries that are the most common forums for litigation—
such as “England or English or Britain or British % international or
foreign”—without finding any new usable cases.117
E. Unavailable Opinions and Selection Bias
Every case I coded has produced at least one opinion that is either
published in the Federal Supplement or unpublished and available on
Westlaw or Lexis. While all published opinions are on Westlaw and Lexis,
most opinions courts issue are unavailable.118 This study’s sample included
thirty-one published opinions and ninety-seven unpublished opinions. I
relied on both types of opinion in calculating the relationship between
foreign antisuit injunction decision and settlement.119 I also conducted
robustness checks within the groups.120
According to previous research, there are significant differences
between published, unpublished, and unavailable opinions.121 For example,
published opinions generally discuss more novel, complex, and important
116 See, e.g., MWK Recruiting, Inc. v. Jowers, No. 18-cv-00444, 2019 WL 5927288 (W.D. Tex. Nov.
12, 2019); MWK Recruiting, Inc. v. Jowers, No. 18-cv-00444 (W.D. Tex. filed May 25, 2018) (open);
Hart Dairy Creamery Corp. v. Kea Invs. Ltd., No. 20-cv-20452, 2020 WL 6363904 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 29,
2020); Notice of Appeal, Hart Dairy Creamery Corp. v. Kea Invs. Ltd., No. 20-cv-20452 (S.D. Fla. Nov.
25, 2020); Hart Dairy Creamer Corp. v. Kea Invs. Ltd., No. 20-cv-14451 (S.D. Fla. filed Nov. 25, 2020)
(pending appeal).
117 I ran additional searches for Japan, Wales, Canada, Australia, and France—countries with the
highest numbers of civil suits filed. See J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Comparative Litigation
Rates 7–10 (Harv. John M. Olin Ctr. for L., Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 681, 2010), http://www.
law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Ramseyer_681.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KNF-BFEU].
118 Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119, 125
(2002) (“[J]udicial decisions represent only the very tip of the mass of grievances.”); Lizotte, supra note
112, at 146 (finding that federal reporters contain as few as 12% of summary judgment dispositions, while
Lexis and Westlaw, together, make 41% of dispositions available).
119 Cf. Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip: A Comparison of
Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1133, 1138–39
(1990) (including in their study both published and unpublished decisions as I define them here);
Christopher A. Whytock, Myth or Mess? International Choice of Law in Action, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 719,
743 n.120 (2009) (same).
120 See infra Section IV.E for findings.
121 I use “published” to mean opinions in the Federal Supplement and “unpublished” for opinions
publicly available on Westlaw or Lexis but not in any case law reporter. To refer to opinions that are not
in any case law reporter or on Westlaw or Lexis, I use “unavailable.”
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issues than unpublished opinions,122 and unpublished opinions may be less
mundane than unavailable opinions.123 Further, publishing norms vary by
circuit and district.124 If the process through which opinions become
published or available correlates with case outcomes or litigants’ choices, I
cannot draw valid inferences about the law from the observable opinions.125
By extension, conclusions about litigant behavior within observable
cases might not translate into conclusions about litigant behavior in general.
Since the strength of a case on the merits can influence settlement rates,126
the difficulty of a court’s decision whether to enjoin foreign litigation could
affect settlement too. And if available cases present tougher decisions than
unavailable cases, available foreign antisuit injunction decisions may cause
a greater shift in certainty for litigants than unavailable decisions.
The relationship between settlement and certainty—such as certainty
about whether parallel litigation will stop or continue—is the subject of
speculative debate.127 Gaining information upon the resolution of a foreign
122

See Lizotte, supra note 112, at 146; see Edward K. Cheng, Detection and Correction of CasePublication Bias, 47 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 151 (2018) (“The observable case law in databases like
Westlaw and LexisNexis is not a representative sample of the universe of legal decisions.”); Siegelman
& Donohue, supra note 119, at 1150 (stating that “cases with published decisions tend to be more
complex” than unpublished cases).
123 See, e.g., Submission Guidelines for Court Opinions: Submit Judicial Opinions to Thomson
Reuters for Publication, WESTLAW, https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/solutions/government/courtopinion-submission-guidelines [https://perma.cc/58NE-QJXJ] (urging judges to submit opinions for
reporting that are “of general interest and importance to the bench and bar,” then encouraging judges to
“exercise liberal discretion in submitting opinions for online-only reporting”); Joseph L. Gerken, A
Librarian’s Guide to Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 96 LAW LIBR. J. 475, 479 (2004); see also Christina
L. Boyd, Pauline T. Kim & Margo Schlanger, Mapping the Iceberg: The Impact of Data Sources on the
Study of District Courts, 17 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 466, 468 (2020) (listing factors influencing the
availability of an unpublished opinion on Westlaw or Lexis, including whether the judge has justified the
decision in writing and whether it is an opinion or an order).
124 Gbemende E. Johnson, Adjudicating Executive Privilege: Federal Administrative Agencies and
Deliberative Process Privilege Claims in U.S. District Courts, 53 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 823, 838 (2019)
(“Circuits develop varying norms and procedures for opinion publishing, and individual, institutional,
and political factors influence whether district judges formally publish their decisions.”); Lizotte, supra
note 112, at 146 (noting the “drastic variation” among districts’ publishing procedures); Siegelman &
Donohue, supra note 119, at 1144 (finding substantial differences in the publication rates of judicial
districts).
125 Cheng, supra note 122, at 152, 156. For examples of studies measuring case-publication bias, see
Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 119, at 1145, and Lizotte, supra note 112, at 109.
126
See Benjamin Sunshine & Víctor Abel Pereyra, Access-to-Justice v. Efficiency: An Empirical
Study of Settlement Rates After Twombly & Iqbal, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 357, 388 (2015) (“Meritorious
cases settle at a higher rate than nonmeritorious cases.”); Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 18, at 125
(“Strong filed cases tend to settle; weak ones do not.”).
127 Compare Edward Brunet, The Efficiency of Summary Judgment, 43 LOYOLA U. L. REV. 689, 697
(2012) (suggesting that “uncertainty deters settlement”), with D. Theodore Rave, Questioning the
Efficiency of Summary Judgment, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 892–93 (2006) (suggesting that parties may
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antisuit injunction decision could encourage some parties to settle, which I
refer to as the information impact.128 Yet others might be reluctant to settle
after investing significant resources into arguing foreign antisuit injunction
motions—either because of the importance of the issues at stake or because
the expended litigation costs are recyclable, making subsequent stages of
litigation less expensive.129 While foreign antisuit injunction motions can be
expensive,130 their resolution does not reflect cases’ underlying merits. So, if
the costs of arguing antisuit injunction motions are not recyclable, the
information impact of their decisions may push toward settlement with
greater force than cost-recycling incentives.131 And the information impact
may vary between published, unpublished, and unavailable antisuit
injunction decisions.
In short, this Note’s results might not reflect the universe of unavailable
opinions and unobserved litigants.132 Published and unpublished cases might
tend to be more complex and difficult than unavailable cases, potentially
requiring more resources of courts and litigants.133 And the outcomes may
differ. For litigants, the resources invested and the certainty that courts’
decisions provide might influence settlement—potentially distorting the
relationship between antisuit injunction decisions and settlement.
To avoid this potential selection bias, future studies might look beyond
the visible tip of cases available on Westlaw and Lexis—perhaps to
PACER—to the iceberg of international parallel-proceedings cases to
randomly sample and code.134 Doing so was impracticable here, and this Note
avoid settlement after sinking litigation costs into arguing a significant motion if subsequent litigation
will be less expensive as a result).
128 Cf. Brunet, supra note 127, at 697 (arguing that certainty after summary judgment induces
settlement).
129 Cf. Rave, supra note 127, at 892–95 (discussing this potential effect in the summary judgment
context).
130 As an extreme example, Canon Latin America paid $2.9 million in attorneys’ fees—the subject
of a later malpractice suit—in its fight to enjoin parallel litigation in Costa Rica. See Nathan Hale, Canon
Unit Hits Miami Law Firm with $3M Malpractice Suit, LAW360 (Sept. 27, 2013, 9:10 PM), https://
www.law360.com/articles/476529/canon-unit-hits-miami-law-firm-with-3m-malpractice-suit [https://
perma.cc/CUM5-P394]; Canon Latin Am. Inc. v. Lantech, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1373–75 (2007).
131 I am not aware of empirical research showing how these competing pressures for and against
settlement play out across cases. And I did not attempt to measure how difficult, important, or uncertain
cases were.
132 Samuel P. Baumgartner & Christopher A. Whytock, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments,
Systemic Calibration, and the Global Law Market, 23 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 119, 132 (2022).
133 See infra notes 139–140 and accompanying text.
134 See David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil Procedure,
65 STAN. L. REV. 1203, 1208–09 (2015) (explaining the possibility of using PACER websites to create a
random sample). But see Cheng, supra note 122, at 157 (noting that PACER, like Westlaw, is imperfect);
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aims to draw empirical attention to international parallel proceedings and
settlement rather than prove a causal relationship.
Although a sample including unavailable opinions would be ideal,
studying available opinions alone is worthwhile because available opinions
influence actors beyond the parties to the case.135 Unavailable opinions do
not.136 When rational actors face international parallel proceedings, they
consult the internet of available case law before deciding whether to move
for an antisuit injunction, litigate in multiple forums, or settle.137 So while
outcomes and influence on party behavior, including settlements, may differ
between published, unpublished, and unavailable cases, available cases have
special relevance.138
Further, outcomes in unavailable cases may vary from unpublished
cases in the same way that unpublished cases differ from published cases.139
For example, if unpublished cases tend to be less complex than published
cases, unavailable cases might present even more straightforward issues.140
At least, the bias is unlikely to move in the opposite direction. Next, I explain
how I coded the cases.
Baumgartner & Whytock, supra note 132, at 132 n.52 (explaining that PACER lacks full-text search
capacity). For scholarship discussing issues with using Westlaw or Lexis for empirical research, see
Merritt E. McAlister, Missing Decisions, 169 U. PA. L. REV. 1101, 1104–05 (2021); Boyd et al., supra
note 123, at 467–69 (2020); Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Submerged Precedent, 16 NEV. L.J. 515, 516
(2016); Peter W. Martin, District Court Opinions that Remain Hidden Despite a Long-Standing
Congressional Mandate of Transparency—the Result of Judicial Autonomy and Systemic Indifference,
110 LAW LIBR. J. 305, 313 (2018); Engstrom, supra, at 1214–15; and David A. Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman
& Jeffrey R. Lidicker, Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 686-88
(2007). For examples of empirical projects relying on Westlaw or Lexis, see Samuel Issacharoff &
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, The Hollowed Out Common Law, 67 UCLA L. REV. 600, 607 (2020);
Johnson, supra note 124, at 834; Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Statutory Interpretation and the Rest of the
Iceberg: Divergences Between the Lower Federal Courts and the Supreme Court, 68 DUKE L.J. 1, 30
(2018); Neal Devins & David Klein, The Vanishing Common Law Judge?, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 607
(2017); Sunshine & Pereyra, supra note 126, at 383; Whytock, supra note 119, at 754; and see also Lee
Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 110 (2002), which describes how
random sampling may prevent or reduce selection bias.
135 Baumgartner & Whytock, supra note 132, at 133. Professor Whytock calls this influence the
“transnational shadow of the law.” Christopher A. Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global Governance,
84 TUL. L. REV. 67, 72 (2009).
136 See McCuskey, supra note 134, at 516–17.
137 See Baumgartner & Whytock, supra note 132, at 133.
138 See id.
139 See id. at 132–33, 133 n.56, 154, 155 fig.C-1 (finding that unpublished opinions more frequently
recognize and enforce foreign judgments than published opinions and inferring that unavailable opinions
may have a higher rate of recognition and enforcement); Johnson, supra note 124, at 838–39 (studying
cases from Lexis and controlling for whether opinions are published); Siegelman & Donohue, supra note
119, at 1137 (explaining that differences between published and unpublished cases can inform
interpretation of results to overcome selection bias); see also infra Section IV.E (comparing published
and unpublished opinions).
140 See Baumgartner & Whytock, supra note 132, at 132, 154.
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F. Defining and Coding Settlement
The definition of settlement is crucial to any study comparing
settlement rates.141 Since this Note focuses on how financial pressure relates
to case outcomes, I define settlement to include disputes resolved through
private agreement, mediation,142 dismissal for want of prosecution,143
stipulated voluntary dismissal,144 or default judgment.145 I include the latter
three outcomes among settlements because the additional expense of
international parallel proceedings could contribute to plaintiffs’ or
defendants’ decisions to stop litigating. By contrast, it is less likely that
financial pressure on litigants influences judges’ decisions to dismiss cases
on the merits or for jurisdictional or procedural reasons.146 So the study did
not treat those types of cases as settlements.
As Professor Theodore Eisenberg and Charlotte Lanvers have
observed, whether dismissals in favor of parallel litigation or arbitration are
settlements is unclear.147 I followed their lead in underincluding cases that
could have settled after dismissal from the district court if I could not find

141 See Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 18, at 115 (citing Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities
Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1955 n.180 (2009)).
142 For most of the cases in this study, no publicly available information indicated whether parties
settled privately or with help from a mediator.
143 There were no cases in this sample ending in dismissal for want of prosecution—that is, because
the parties became inactive for a certain amount of time—but I suggest that future studies aiming to build
on these results include such cases as settlements.
144 I did not count a disputed voluntary dismissal as a settlement. In one case, the plaintiff sought
voluntary dismissal of its claims and the defendants’ counterclaims without prejudice and the dissolution
of the court’s foreign antisuit injunction to allow the plaintiff to litigate in Egypt. Joint Status Report at
3, Tahaya Misr Inv. Inc. v. Helwan Cement S.A.E., No. 16-cv-01001 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2016). The
defendants sought dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims with prejudice and summary judgment on their
counterclaims. Id. at 3–4. The court granted the plaintiff’s motion for voluntary dismissal without
prejudice and awarded the defendants attorneys’ fees. Final Judgment of Dismissal & Award of
Attorneys’ Fees at 8, Tahaya Misr Inv. Inc. v. Helwan Cement S.A.E., No. 16-cv-01001 (C.D. Cal. Mar.
17, 2017). Despite the apparent awkwardness of carving this disputed voluntary dismissal out from the
stipulated voluntary dismissals, Tahaya’s adversarial resolution would be more awkward to shoehorn into
the settlement category.
145 See Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 18, at 116 (explaining that defining “settlement” to include
default judgments and dismissals for lack of prosecution is appropriate to contrast “settled” cases with
those resolved on the merits after contested proceedings but inappropriate to measure party success). As
with disputed voluntary dismissals, I did not code the two cases ending in disputed default judgments as
settled. See Sindhi v. Raina, No. 15-cv-03229, 2017 WL 4167511, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 2017)
(denying motion to overturn default judgment); CFTC v. Lake Shore Asset Mgmt. Ltd., No. 07-cv-03598,
2008 WL 2945453, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 10, 2008) (granting default judgment because of defendant’s
“willful misconduct” including defying discovery orders and hiding documents).
146 See Chang & Hubbard supra note 111, at 79 (distinguishing “settlements, withdrawals, and
successful mediations” from “judgment[s] in which the court renders a verdict that declares a winner and
awards (or declines to award) damages or issues an injunction”).
147 Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 18, at 117–18.
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any evidence of subsequent settlement.148 Because this approach might skew
settlement rates lower, I also conducted alternative calculations to see if my
results hold after excluding ambiguous cases or counting them as settled.
For example, cases which ended in judgment compelling arbitration
could have settled before the arbitrator issued an award.149 The sample
included twelve cases for which this was possible. But even if all those cases
settled out of arbitration, the results hold.150 More likely, fewer settled.
Then, it is more difficult to guess how many cases could have settled
after a final judgment on the merits by the U.S. court but before a judgment
in a foreign tribunal.151 Yet this possibility only concerns the cases where
courts refused to enjoin foreign parallel proceedings. If the settlement rate is
higher among most of those cases, the observed rise in settlement after
foreign antisuit injunction denials would become more extreme.152
The exception to that rule is for the nine cases I coded as antisuit
injunction grants because the courts practically ended the parallel nature of
the litigation, consolidating the proceedings in the foreign forum.153 But the
results are robust to dropping these cases or imagining that all of them
settled,154 which is unlikely considering some foreign courts give preclusive
effect to U.S. courts’ judgments.155 In fact, the results hold after excluding
the seventeen cases that could have settled before an arbitration award or a
foreign tribunal’s judgment.156 Even if all seventeen of these cases settled
(100.0%)—an improbably high figure—the observed rise in settlement after
foreign antisuit injunction denial remains statistically significant.157

148

See id.
See Jill I. Gross, Bargaining in the (Murky) Shadow of Arbitration, 24 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
185, 198 (2019) (“[S]ettlement rates for cases filed in arbitration are reasonably similar to those for
litigation.”).
150 See infra Section IV.A.
151 Some parallel foreign tribunals would give final judgments of U.S. courts preclusive effect,
presumably lowering the odds of post-U.S.-judgment settlement. See Baumgartner, Understanding the
Obstacles, supra note 41, at 967. For a comparison of settlement rates across countries, see Chang &
Klerman, supra note 104, at 5–12. Estimating the likelihood of settlement after U.S. courts’ final
judgments and before foreign tribunals’ judgments is beyond the scope of this empirical project.
152 See infra Section IV.A (finding the settlement rate more than doubled after courts denied foreign
antisuit injunctions).
153
See infra Section IV.A.
154 Infra notes 174–175 and accompanying text.
155 See Baumgartner, Understanding the Obstacles, supra note 41, at 967. Considering the results of
Professors Chang and Klerman’s global comparison of settlement rates suggests that a settlement rate of
100% among these cases would be anomalous. See Chang & Klerman, supra note 104, at 8 fig.2, 10 fig.3.
156 Infra Section IV.A. There were four cases that ended in judgment compelling arbitration and
simultaneous denial of a foreign antisuit injunction, which I coded as antisuit injunction grants.
157 Infra notes 178–180 and accompanying text.
149
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To determine whether the parties settled after the court issued a foreign
antisuit injunction decision, I looked at the case’s court docket on Bloomberg
Law.158 Where the docket did not indicate whether the parties settled, I used
Google to search for news articles reporting settlement.159 As noted above,
alternative calculations helped ensure that missing information did not
significantly skew my results. For each settlement rate, I calculated a 95%
confidence interval, estimating the range of likely values to a 95%
certainty—a standard percentage for confidence intervals.160 I used a twosample z-test of proportions to calculate the significance of differences in
settlement rates.161
G. Coding Independent Variables
For each case, I recorded the district court’s foreign antisuit injunction
decision, the ultimate disposition, the type of case, decisions on motions to
dismiss or for summary judgment, the subsequent appellate history, the legal
standard (restrictive or permissive),162 the foreign forum, the forum in which
the case was first filed, the cause of action, the amount in controversy, the
basis of jurisdiction, the citizenship of the parties, whether the parallel
litigation was reactive or repetitive,163 and whether the case produced
published or unpublished opinions. I found this information on Bloomberg
Law’s database of court dockets. Because this study aims to measure the
effect of ongoing international parallel proceedings on settlement, I counted
158 See, e.g., Joint Stipulation & Order for Dismissal with Prejudice at 2, Huawei Techs. Co. v.
Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 16-cv-02787 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2019) (indicating dismissal pursuant to
settlement agreement).
159 See, e.g., Astrid Jatzkowski, Patent-Vergleich: Qiagen Vertraut Vossius und Hogan Lovells bei
Einigung mit Abbott, JUVE (Oct. 14, 2010), https://www.juve.de/nachrichten/verfahren/2010/10/patentvergleich-qiagen-vertraut-vossius-und-hogan-lovells-bei-einigung-mit-abbott [https://perma.cc/J9KFNR82] (reporting that the parties settled in Germany); see also Abbott Lab’ys v. Qiagen Gaithersburg,
Inc., No. 10-cv-00712, 2010 WL 1539952, at *1, *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2010) (denying motion for antisuit
injunction and compelling arbitration).
160 A confidence interval measures the certainty of a result by estimating a range of values that is
likely to contain the true value. See Confidence Intervals, YALE UNIV. DEP’T OF STAT., http://www.stat.
yale.edu/Courses/1997-98/101/confint.htm [https://perma.cc/5P3S-7PWJ]. Most studies use a 95%
confidence level. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 18, at 120 (conducting an empirical study of
settlement rates and using a 95% confidence level).
161 A two-sample z-test of proportions estimates the likelihood that two population proportions are
significantly different—such as the proportion of cases that settle after a court grants an antisuit injunction
and the proportion of cases that settle after an antisuit injunction denial. Zach, Two Proportion Z-Test:
Definition, Formula, and Example, STATOLOGY (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.statology.org/twoproportion-z-test [https://perma.cc/8L7Q-CBZT]. The test’s results may allow rejection of the null
hypothesis that the two proportions are equal. Id.
162 I coded the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits as restrictive; the
Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits as permissive; and the Fourth Circuit as undecided. See supra Part II.
163 Supra notes 45–50 and accompanying text (explaining repetitive and reactive litigation).
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cases in which a federal circuit court vacated a district court’s order granting
a foreign antisuit injunction motion among those cases in which a district
court denied relief. And I included the one case in which a federal circuit
court reversed a district court’s denial of a foreign antisuit injunction motion
with the cases in which courts granted foreign antisuit injunction motions.164
Similarly, when the district court denied a foreign antisuit injunction
motion but simultaneously stayed, dismissed, or otherwise ended the
domestic proceedings in favor of foreign proceedings—thereby
consolidating the proceedings in the foreign forum—I coded the case as if
the court had granted relief.165 Again, removing these nine cases, or
imagining that all of them settled, does not significantly change the results.166
Of course, staying, dismissing, or resolving domestic litigation could
affect parties’ strategic positions differently than enjoining foreign litigation.
Depending on whether a foreign forum recognizes and enforces U.S.
judgments, for instance, a U.S. court’s decision to grant summary judgment
or merits-based dismissal could impact litigants’ chances of success in the
foreign forum; litigants’ probability of success, in turn, could affect the
likelihood of settlement.167 Further, the parallel forums might apply different
substantive law, which could change the likely outcome on the merits. And
the costs of litigating exclusively in the foreign forum are likely to be lower
than the costs of litigating exclusively in the United States.168 While I drew a
line between decisions allowing parallel proceedings to continue and
decisions ending parallel proceedings, future studies may benefit from
measuring settlement rates within additional subcategories of case outcomes.

164 See E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Andina Licores S.A., No. 05-cv-00101, 2005 WL 1554001, at *13
(E.D. Cal. June 24, 2005), rev’d, 446 F.3d 984, 986–87 (9th Cir. 2006); Order of Final Judgment at 7–8,
E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Andina Licores S.A., No. 05-cv-00101 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2007) (permanently
enjoining the defendant from litigating a parallel case in Ecuador).
165 See, e.g., MacDermid Offshore Sols., LLC v. Niche Prods., LLC, No. 12-cv-02483, 2013 WL
3980870, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2013) (denying motion for foreign antisuit injunction but granting
motion for stay in favor of foreign parallel proceedings); Aruba Hotel Enters. N.V. v. Belfonti, 611 F.
Supp. 2d 203, 215 (D. Conn. 2009) (denying motion for foreign antisuit injunction but granting crossmotions for summary judgment); Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods, Ltd., 237 F. Supp. 2d 394, 425, 447
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (denying motion for foreign antisuit injunction but granting motion to dismiss in favor
of foreign proceedings); Fellowes, Inc. v. Changzhou Xinrui Fellowes Off. Equip. Co., 759 F.3d 787, 790
(7th Cir. 2014) (vacating the district court’s order granting a foreign antisuit injunction motion and
remanding with orders to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). But see Skidmore Energy, Inc.
v. KPMG, No. 03-cv-02138, 2004 WL 2804888, at *8–9 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 2004) (denying motion for
antisuit injunction and granting motion to dismiss as to some but not all defendants).
166 See infra Section IV.A.
167 See Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 18, at 124–25 (“Strong filed cases tend to settle; weak ones
do not.”); Baumgartner, Understanding the Obstacles, supra note 41, at 967.
168 See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 106, at 1–3, 6; LAWS. FOR CIV. JUST.
ET AL., supra note 106, at 3.
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*

*

*

This Part has discussed how I compiled and analyzed an original sample
of 128 cases from Westlaw and Lexis in which federal district courts decided
foreign antisuit injunction motions. In short, I compared the settlement rate
for cases where foreign parallel proceedings ended with that of cases where
courts allowed parallel litigation to continue. There are unavoidable
limitations of studying only published or electronically available cases. And
the universe of case outcomes and the factors that influence settlement do
not translate easily into codable variables. Yet, I have attempted to grapple
with these issues and chart a path for future studies. I turn next to the results.
IV. RESULTS
When courts deny foreign antisuit injunction motions, the settlement
rate rises. The headline results appear in Table 1 in Section IV.A, showing
that settlement occurred more than twice as often after antisuit injunction
denials compared with antisuit injunction grants. The remainder of this Part
measures and discusses other variables that could have potentially skewed
the findings. Overall, the rise in settlement persisted across the variables
observed. This study’s early evidence of the settlement effect suggests a
correlation between foreign antisuit injunction denial and settlement, which
does not imply a causal relationship. Further studies of international parallel
proceedings should consider questions of causation.
A. Foreign Antisuit Injunction Motion Decisions and Settlement
When courts permitted foreign parallel proceedings to continue over an
antisuit injunction motion, the settlement rate more than doubled. Of the
seventy cases in which courts granted foreign antisuit injunction motions or
otherwise ended parallel proceedings,169 twenty-five cases settled (35.7%).170
By contrast, forty-five out of fifty-eight cases settled after a denial
(77.6%).171 The discrepancy is statistically significant with a 95% level of

169 See supra Section III.C (explaining why the study counted cases in which courts denied foreign
antisuit injunction motions but otherwise ended parallel litigation as if the courts had granted the
motions).
170 Infra Table 1.
171 Infra Table 1.
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confidence,172 and the confidence intervals for the settlement rates do not
overlap.173

Settlement Rate

FIGURE 1: FOREIGN ANTISUIT INJUNCTION (ASI) DECISION AND SETTLEMENT RATE
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Foreign Antisuit Injunction (ASI) Decision

TABLE 1: FOREIGN ANTISUIT INJUNCTION (ASI) DECISION AND SETTLEMENT RATE
Foreign ASI
Decision
ASI Granted
ASI Denied

172

Settled

Cases

35.7%

25/70

95% CI (Confidence
Interval)
24.5–46.9

77.6%

45/58

66.9–88.3

The p-value is < 0.001. A p-value is the likelihood that the data observed could have been
distributed as it is by random chance, rather than because of an effect being measured. Ronald L.
Wasserstein & Nicole A. Lazar, The ASA Statement on P-Values: Context, Process, and Purpose, 70 AM.
STATISTICIAN 129, 131 (2016), https://amstat.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00031305.2016.
1154108?needAccess=true [https://perma.cc/7EEX-RAUL]. A smaller p-value suggests that the effect
being tested is real. See id. Here, the null hypothesis is that courts’ decisions on foreign antisuit injunction
motions have no relationship with the probability of settlement, and the low p-value may indicate that
this null hypothesis is incompatible with the results appearing in Table 1. For this study, I consider a pvalue below 0.05—corresponding with a less than 5% chance that the results are consistent with the null
hypothesis being true—to be statistically significant, a decision in line with general statistical practices.
Id.; cf. Brian Resnick, 800 Scientists Say It’s Time to Abandon “Statistical Significance,” VOX (May 22,
2019, 12:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/latest-news/2019/3/22/18275913/statistical-significance-pvalues-explained [https://perma.cc/9ATS-AT4X] (stressing the importance of properly interpreting pvalues and other measures of statistical significance). Recall that I calculated p-values using a two-sample
z-test of proportions. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
173
See infra Table 1; see also Andrea Knezevic, Overlapping Confidence Intervals and Statistical
Significance, CORNELL STAT. CONSULTING UNIT (2020), https://cscu.cornell.edu/wp-content/uploads/
73_ci.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8EW-F9FM] (explaining that “[i]f two statistics have non-overlapping
confidence intervals, they are necessarily significantly different but if they have overlapping confidence
intervals, it is not necessarily true that they are not significantly different”).
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Further, these results hold after dropping the nine cases where courts
denied antisuit injunction motions but otherwise consolidated the parallel
proceedings—through stays, dismissals, or judgments—cases I coded as
antisuit injunction grants.174 Even assuming all those cases settled before the
foreign tribunal, the significant rise in settlement after antisuit injunction
denials persists.175 Likewise, for the twelve cases that ended in judgment
compelling arbitration and could have settled before a final award, the
settlement effect holds after dropping or recoding them as settlements.176
There remains a statistically significant rise in settlement after antisuit
injunction denial even dropping all seventeen cases that could have settled
before a foreign tribunal or before an arbitration award.177 Now imagine that
instead, all seventeen of these cases had settled: the rise in settlement after
antisuit injunction denial would remain significant.178 Of course, because
arbitrations settle at a rate similar to court cases179 and U.S. courts’ judgments
may bind litigants in later foreign proceedings,180 a settlement rate of 100.0%
among these cases would be an anomaly.
But correlation between foreign antisuit injunction decision and
settlement—no matter how significant—does not demonstrate causation.
Thus, while this study reveals a significantly higher settlement rate after
foreign antisuit injunction denials, the results are strongest in signifying that

174 Considering only the true antisuit injunction grants, twenty-five of sixty-one cases settled (41.0%)
(95% CI = 28.6–53.3). Compared with the antisuit injunction denials (77.6%) (95% CI = 66.9–88.3), the
p-value is < 0.001, and here too the confidence intervals do not overlap. See supra Section III.C.
175 If all these cases settled, that would make thirty-four out of seventy (48.6%) (95% CI = 36.9–
60.3). Compared with antisuit injunction denials (77.6%) (95% CI = 66.9–88.3), the confidence intervals
do not overlap, and the p-value is 0.001.
176 Dropping the twelve cases that could have settled after a court compelled arbitration but before
the arbitrator issued an award, twenty-five out of fifty-eight settled (43.1%) (95% CI = 30.4–55.8).
Compared with the antisuit injunction denials (77.6%) (95% CI = 66.9–88.3), the confidence intervals do
not overlap, and the p-value is < 0.001. Then, if thirty-seven out of seventy cases settled (52.9%) (95%
CI = 41.2–64.6), compared with antisuit injunction denials, the p-value is 0.004, and the confidence
intervals do not overlap. Recall that I coded the four cases that ended in judgment compelling arbitration
and simultaneous antisuit injunction denial as antisuit injunction grants. Supra note 156.
177 Considering only cases that had no possibility of settling after foreign antisuit injunction grants
and ultimate dispositions in U.S. courts, twenty-five out of fifty-three settled (47.2%) (95% CI = 33.7–
60.6). Compared with the antisuit injunction denials (77.6%) (95% CI = 66.9–88.3), the p-value is 0.001,
and the confidence intervals do not overlap.
178 If forty-two out of seventy cases settled after an antisuit injunction grant (60.0%) (95% CI = 48.5–
71.5), compared with antisuit injunction denials (77.6%), the p-value is 0.034.
179 See Gross, supra note 149, at 198.
180 See Baumgartner, Understanding the Obstacles, supra note 41, at 967. If U.S. judgments
sometimes have preclusive effect in foreign forums—reducing uncertainty about the outcome of foreign
proceedings—settlement rates should tend to be lower.
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international parallel proceedings deserve greater empirical attention.181
Further, other factors might have contributed to the disparate settlement
rates. So the rest of this Part will discuss the additional variables I
measured—and those I did not measure—that could have skewed the results.
Specifically, I explore case type in Section IV.B, amount in controversy in
Section IV.C, repetitive and reactive litigation in Section IV.D, published
and unpublished opinions in Section IV.E, and dispositive motions in
Section IV.F. Then, in Section IV.G, I discuss factors I did not measure and
offer recommendations for future studies.
B. Case Type
The first variable I considered that may have affected the results is case
type. The relationship between foreign antisuit injunction decision and
settlement appears robust to case type,182 although comparing certain types
of cases produced statistically significant differences in settlement. Existing
empirical studies have also shown significant settlement differences by case
type.183 Because case types are not mutually exclusive, I coded the case type
for cases with claims sounding in more than one category by judging the
predominant flavor of the complaint.184
Notably, arbitration cases were unique in that they settled at a
significantly lower rate than all other case types.185 Arbitration cases also
divided the most unevenly into antisuit injunction grants (25.7% of all
antisuit injunction grant cases) and denials (8.6% of all denial cases). So the
higher number of arbitration cases among the cases in which courts enjoined
foreign litigation could have weighed down the settlement rate.186 But
181 For example, larger studies using random sampling and regression analysis could help confirm
or deny the observed correlation. See Amy Gallo, A Refresher on Regression Analysis, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Nov. 4, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/11/a-refresher-on-regression-analysis [https://perma.cc/Q2UZSLTH] (explaining how to use regression modeling and analysis to infer relatedness).
182 The types of cases were contract, arbitration, intellectual property, tort, and other. The arbitration
cases involved a variety of underlying subject matter, but the dispute in the district court focused on
whether the case should be submitted to arbitration or whether an arbitration award should be enforced.
183 See Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 18, at 121–25, 133, 135 (discussing earlier studies on
settlement and case type and finding that tort cases settle at a significantly higher rate than other case
types).
184 Some cases presented difficult choices. See, e.g., Verified Complaint at 3–6, Maroc Fruit Board
S.A. v. M/V Almeda Star, 11-cv-12091 (D. Mass. Nov. 25, 2011) (alleging two contract claims and two
tort claims). I put Maroc in the “contract” bucket because the dispute arose out of a shipping contract.
185 Comparing the settlement rate of arbitration cases (13.0%) with that of intellectual property cases
(72.7%) and contract cases (61.3%), the p-values are < 0.001. Comparing the arbitration settlement rate
with the tort settlement rate (71.4%), the p-value is 0.002. And comparing arbitration cases with other
cases (57.1%), the p-value is 0.004.
186 Zero out of eighteen arbitration cases settled after courts granted foreign antisuit injunction
motions.
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excluding all arbitration cases from the sample, foreign antisuit injunction
denials still correlated with a significantly higher settlement rate.187
At the other extreme, intellectual property cases—the case type with the
highest settlement rate—made up 12.9% of antisuit injunction grants and
22.4% of denials. Yet, the significant settlement rise after foreign antisuit
injunction denial persists after dropping all intellectual property cases.188
Although I found no statistically significant settlement variance between
case types besides arbitration, this study’s sample size for most case types
does not permit meaningful inferences about the relationship between case
type and settlement.
Nonetheless, the foreign antisuit injunction settlement effect holds
across most case types. The settlement rate is significantly higher after
foreign antisuit injunction denial for contract,189 intellectual property,190 and
arbitration cases.191 I found directional support within tort and “other” cases,
although there were too few of those cases to find statistical significance.192
Table 2 summarizes these findings, showing a strong pattern of a
significant rise in settlement after foreign antisuit injunction denial despite
changes in case type. Only arbitration cases produced significant differences
in settlement compared to other case types, and the antisuit injunction
settlement effect persisted after dropping arbitration cases from the sample.
So foreign antisuit injunction decisions seem to have a stronger connection
to settlement rates than case type.

187 Excluding arbitration cases, forty-two out of fifty-four cases settled after courts denied foreign
antisuit injunction motions (77.8%) (95% CI = 66.7–88.9), while twenty-five out of fifty-one cases settled
after courts granted relief (49.0%) (95% CI = 35.3–62.7). Comparing these proportions, the confidence
intervals do not overlap, and the p-value is 0.002.
188 Removing intellectual property cases, twenty-one out of sixty cases settled after a foreign antisuit
injunction grant (35.0%) (95% CI = 22.9–47.1), while thirty-three out of forty-six cases settled after a
denial (71.7%) (95% CI = 58.7–84.8). The p-value is < 0.001, and the confidence intervals do not overlap.
189 Within the contract cases, seventeen out of thirty-five cases settled after a foreign antisuit
injunction grant (48.6%) (95% CI = 32.0–65.1), compared with twenty-one out of twenty-seven after a
denial (77.8%) (95% CI = 62.1–93.5). The p-value is 0.019.
190 For the intellectual property cases, four out of nine cases settled after a court granted relief
(44.4%) (95% CI = 12.0–76.9), while twelve out of thirteen cases settled after a denial (92.3%) (95%
CI = 77.8–100.0). The p-value is 0.013.
191 In the sample of arbitration cases, zero out of eighteen cases settled after a foreign antisuit
injunction grant (0.0%) (95% CI = 0.0–0.0), while three out of five settled after a denial (60.0%) (95%
CI = 17.1–100.0). The p-value is < 0.001.
192 Within the tort cases, one out of two cases settled after a foreign antisuit injunction grant (50.0%)
(95% CI = 0.0–100.0), while four out of five settled after a denial (80.0%) (95% CI = 44.9–100.0). The
p-value is 0.427. For the other cases, three out of six settled after a foreign antisuit injunction grant
(50.0%) (95% CI = 10.0–90.0), while five out of eight settled after a denial (62.5%) (95% CI = 29.0–
96.0). The p-value is 0.640.

1611

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
TABLE 2: CASE TYPE, FOREIGN ANTISUIT INJUNCTION (ASI)
DECISION, AND SETTLEMENT RATE
Case Type
Contract
Arbitration
IP (Intellectual
Property)
Tort

Settled|ASI
Grant
48.6%
0.0%

17/35
0/18

Settled|ASI
Denial
77.8%
60.0%

44.4%

4/9

92.3%

12/13

0.013

50.0%

1/2

80.0%

4/5

0.427

Cases

Cases

p-Value*

21/27
3/5

0.019
< 0.001

Other
50.0%
3/6
62.5%
5/8
0.640
Note. A two-sample z-test p-value < 0.05 means that the difference between two settlement
rates is statistically significant.

C. Amount in Controversy
Amount in controversy is the next factor I considered that could have
affected the results. The significant rise in settlement after foreign antisuit
injunction denial also appears robust to the amount in controversy. There are
conflicting theories for how the amount in controversy could impact
settlement.193 Yet, the amount in controversy did not correlate with a
statistically significant difference in settlement.194
Since many complaints do not state the amount in controversy,195 this
study suffers from limited information. There were thirty-three high-value
cases (worth $1,000,000 or more), eighteen low-value cases (worth less than

193 When billions of dollars are at stake, the costs of litigating in multiple forums might not factor
into a settlement decision. See, e.g., Tahaya Misr Inv., Inc. v. Helwan Cement S.A.E., No. 16-cv-01001,
2016 WL 4072332 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2016) (failing to discuss the costs of litigating in multiple forums);
First Amended Complaint at 5, Tahaya Misr Inv. Inc. v. Helwan Cement S.A.E., No. 16-cv-01001 (C.D.
Cal. Apr. 8, 2016) (requesting compensatory damages “in excess of $3,000,000,000.00”). By contrast,
when disputes concern thousands of dollars, duplicative litigation may be an unjustifiable investment.
See, e.g., Complaint for Damages & Injunctive Relief at 21, Oracle Am., Inc. v. Myriad Grp. AG, No.
10-cv-05604 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2010) (requesting “at least $75,000 plus interest” in damages); see also
Stipulation & Order for Dismissal with Prejudice of Claims at 1, Oracle Am., Inc. v. Myriad Grp. AG,
No. 10-cv-05604 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2014) (stating that the parties settled). Of course, stakes may be so
high that a company’s financial survival hinges on the outcome. Some defendants in bet-the-company
litigation might rather settle than try their luck. Then, litigation with low damages requests could be worth
more to litigants than the amount in controversy. For example, plaintiffs often seek injunctive or
declaratory relief in addition to monetary damages, or a case’s outcome could require setting a precedent
with consequences for higher stakes litigation later on. So it is hard to guess how the amount in
controversy influences settlements in the aggregate.
194 Fourteen out of thirty-three high-value cases settled (42.4%) (95% CI = 25.6–59.3), while ten out
of eighteen low-value cases settled (55.6%) (95% CI = 32.6–78.5). The p-value is 0.369.
195 E.g., Complaint at 7, Sindhi v. Raina, No. 15-cv-03229 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2015) (requesting an
unspecified amount in damages). Recall that I found case filings, including complaints, on Bloomberg
Law’s database of court dockets. See supra Sections III.C–III.D.
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$1,000,000), and seventy-seven cases with unknown value. For high-value
cases, the statistically significant rise in settlement after antisuit injunction
denial persists.196 While the sample of low-value cases was too small to
achieve statistical significance, I found directional support.197
The small sample of cases with specified damages requests limits the
usefulness of these results. With amount-in-controversy information for less
than half of the sample, these results hardly clarify whether the amount in
controversy may have interfered with the observed relationship between
foreign antisuit injunction decision and settlement. Further empirical
research on how the stakes in litigation influence settlement rates would be
valuable—especially with a larger sample. Creating more than two amountin-controversy groups would generate a more nuanced picture of the
relationship between stakes and settlement. Certainly, future studies of
parallel proceedings and settlement should attempt to disentangle the effects
of duplicative litigation from the amount in controversy.
TABLE 3: AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY, FOREIGN ANTISUIT INJUNCTION
(ASI) DECISION, AND SETTLEMENT RATE
Amount in
Controversy
High

Settled|ASI
Grant
25.0%

Low
Unknown

45.5%
38.5%

5/20

Settled|ASI
Denial
69.2%

5/11
15/39

71.4%
81.6%

Cases

Cases

p-Value*

9/13

0.012

5/7
31/38

0.280
< 0.001

Note. A two-sample z-test p-value < 0.05 means that the difference between two settlement
rates is statistically significant.

D. Repetitive and Reactive Litigation
The next factor I examined that could have affected the results is
repetitive versus reactive litigation. A significant rise in settlement after
foreign antisuit injunction denial persisted among repetitive and reactive
cases. The settlement rates were not meaningfully different comparing
repetitive and reactive suits.198 This is surprising because, in theory, the

196 Five out of twenty high-value cases settled after a foreign antisuit injunction grant (25.0%) (95%
CI = 6.0–44.0), while nine out of thirteen settled after a denial (69.2%) (95% CI = 44.1–94.3). The pvalue is 0.012, and the confidence intervals do not overlap.
197 Five out of eleven low-value cases settled after an antisuit injunction grant (45.5%) (95%
CI = 16.0–74.9), while five out of seven settled after a denial (71.4%) (95% CI = 38.0–100.0). The pvalue is 0.280.
198 Nine out of eighteen repetitive suits settled (50.0%) (95% CI = 26.9–73.1), while sixty-one out
of 110 reactive suits settled (55.5%) (95% CI = 56.2–64.7). The p-value is 0.667.
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repetitive or reactive nature of a parallel suit could indicate the filer’s motive,
which some courts consider in deciding foreign antisuit injunction
motions.199 And repetitive litigation could indicate harassing behavior or
litigation–resource asymmetry. In other words, parties who bring multiple
suits in varying forums may tend to be wealthier and more able—if not
willing—to bully their opponents into settlement.
Nonetheless, the settlement rate was significantly higher after antisuit
injunction denials within both reactive200 and repetitive cases.201 While it
remains possible that the reactive or repetitive nature of litigation has some
relationship with settlement, the connection between foreign antisuit
injunction decisions and settlement appears to be much stronger.
TABLE 4: REACTIVE OR REPETITIVE SUIT, FOREIGN ANTISUIT INJUNCTION (ASI) DECISION,
AND SETTLEMENT RATE
Reactive or
Repetitive
Reactive
Repetitive

Settled|ASI
Grant
36.2%
33.3%

Cases
21/58
4/12

Settled|ASI
Denial
76.9%
83.3%

Cases

p-Value*

40/52
5/6

< 0.001
0.046

Note. A two-sample z-test p-value < 0.05 means that the difference between two settlement
rates is statistically significant.

E. Published and Unpublished Opinions
The next potentially influential factor I measured is whether the cases
produced published or unpublished opinions. Drawing my sample from
Westlaw and Lexis creates a selection-bias concern.202 Yet, comparing
published and unpublished opinions can inform a guess about which
direction any case-publication bias tilts here.203 Initially, foreign antisuit
injunction outcomes did not reflect much difference between published and
unpublished opinions.204 Even breaking antisuit injunction outcomes down

199

See supra notes 45–50 and accompanying text (discussing repetitive and reactive litigation).
Twenty-one out of fifty-eight reactive suits settled after an antisuit injunction grant (36.2%) (95%
CI = 23.8–48.6), while forty out of fifty-two settled after a denial (76.9%) (95% CI = 65.5–88.4). The
confidence intervals do not overlap, and the p-value is < 0.001.
201 Four out of twelve repetitive suits settled after an antisuit injunction grant (33.3%) (95% CI = 6.7–
60.0), while five out of six settled after a denial (83.3%) (95% CI = 53.5–100.0). The p-value is 0.046.
202 See supra Section III.B.
203 See Cheng, supra note 122, at 152 (coining “case-publication bias”); Baumgartner & Whytock,
supra note 132, at 132–33; supra Section III.B.
204 Eighteen out of thirty-one published opinions granted antisuit injunctions (58.1%) (95%
CI = 40.7–75.4), compared with fifty-two out of ninety-seven unpublished opinions (53.6%) (95%
CI = 43.7–63.5). The p-value is 0.664.
200
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further by legal standard (restrictive or permissive) did not produce much
variation.205 From these comparisons, it is unclear how outcomes in
unavailable opinions might differ from unpublished cases. Assuming
unavailable cases are easier to resolve than unpublished cases, the proportion
of antisuit injunction movants with strong and weak arguments could be
similar. Likewise, settlement rates after published versus unpublished
antisuit injunction opinions were not meaningfully different.206
Yet, as Table 5 shows, the rise in settlement after foreign antisuit
injunction denial was significant within unpublished—but not published—
opinions.207 This difference is noteworthy for two reasons:
First, finding directional, but statistically insignificant, support for the
settlement effect within published cases could suggest that, for litigants who
argue more complex or novel antisuit injunction issues, the costs of parallel
litigation are less likely to influence settlement. If novel or complex antisuit
injunction motions are more costly to argue, cases with published opinions
may tend to involve higher stakes, or the parties may tend to have more
resources. Either generality could, in turn, reduce the impact of the costs of
parallel litigation on settlement. In published cases, other factors such as the
information impact of the decision—which would be the same whether the
court grants or denies the motion—might be more likely to influence
settlement. Decisions on difficult foreign antisuit injunction motions—
whether grants or denials—could impact settlement more evenly than
decisions on straightforward motions. By contrast, the information impact of
an unpublished decision on a straightforward issue would seem to be less
influential since the decision is more likely to align with the parties’
expectations. Perhaps, as the odds of an antisuit injunction motion’s success
approach 50%, the likelihood decreases that the higher costs of litigation
after a denial will prompt settlement.
Second, to the extent any difference between published and
unpublished opinions is driving the difference in settlement effects,
unavailable opinions may differ from unpublished opinions in the same
way.208 Further, if unpublished opinions have a lower information impact on
205 In restrictive circuits, thirteen out of twenty-one published opinions granted relief (61.9%) (95%
CI = 41.1–82.7), compared with twenty-seven out of fifty-two unpublished opinions (51.9%) (95%
CI = 38.3–65.5). The p-value is 0.438. And in permissive circuits, three out of eight published opinions
granted relief (37.5%) (95% CI = 4.0–71.0), compared with twenty-four out of forty-two unpublished
opinions (57.1%) (95% CI = 42.2–72.1). The p-value is 0.307.
206 Seventeen out of thirty-one published cases settled (54.8%) (95% CI = 37.3–72.4), compared
with fifty-three out of ninety-seven unpublished cases (54.6%) (95% CI = 44.7–64.5). The p-value is
0.984.
207 See infra Table 5.
208 See supra Section III.B; Baumgartner & Whytock, supra note 132, at 132–33.
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settlement than published opinions, and litigation costs have a greater
influence on settlement in unpublished than published cases, these
differences could extend to unavailable cases. That is, unavailable opinions
might have an even lower information impact on settlement than unpublished
opinions, which squares with previous findings that unavailable opinions are
more mundane than available opinions. And litigation costs may influence
more settlements after unavailable opinions, compared with unpublished
opinions. This would also make sense if parties pressing complex or novel
antisuit injunction arguments tend to have deeper pockets than parties
arguing more straightforward motions in unavailable cases.
So I would expect the rise in settlement after foreign antisuit injunction
denials to be more extreme among unavailable cases than unpublished cases.
Of course, studying the unavailable opinions would be the best way to
confirm or refute my hypothesis. Alternatively, a future study without the
means to collect all unavailable opinions could rely on regression analysis.209
TABLE 5: PUBLISHED AND UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS, FOREIGN ANTISUIT INJUNCTION
(ASI) DECISION, AND SETTLEMENT RATE
Opinion
Published

Settled|ASI
Grant
44.4%

Cases
8/18

Settled|ASI
Denial
69.2%

Cases

p-Value*

9/13

0.171

Unpublished
32.7%
17/52
80.0%
36/54
< 0.001
Note. A two-sample z-test p-value < 0.05 means that the difference between two settlement
rates is statistically significant.

F. Dispositive Motions
Decisions on dispositive motions to dismiss or motions for summary
judgment could also theoretically affect settlement rates. Since litigation is
expensive, especially discovery and trials,210 when courts refuse either to
dismiss a case or grant summary judgment, settlement might become more
desirable to cost-conscious litigants.211 Further, denials of motions to dismiss

209 See Cheng, supra note 122, at 158 (proposing a method of regression modeling to detect and
correct case-publication bias).
210 Paula Hannaford-Agor, Measuring the Cost of Civil Litigation: Findings from a Survey of Trial
Lawyers, 2013 VOIR DIRE 22, 26 & tbl.2, https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0035/27989/
measuring-cost-civil-litigation.pdf [https://perma.cc/85SA-KWRY] (showing that trial and discovery,
across case types, are the two most expensive phases of litigation).
211 See Brunet, supra note 127, at 692 (“When a motion for summary judgment is denied, the
settlement value of a claim increases. . . . The filing of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6) is likely to create a similar settlement premium.”).
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or motions for summary judgment could induce settlements by clarifying or
narrowing issues and reducing uncertainty about the likely outcome.212
But there is no clear relationship between dispositive motion decisions
and foreign antisuit injunction motion decisions: the former often reflect the
merits of the underlying suit;213 the latter should not.214 Whatever the
relationship between dispositive motion decisions and settlement, it should
not have influenced the observed relationship between foreign antisuit
injunction denial and settlement. The numbers support this hunch. Excluding
the sixteen cases where courts granted dispositive motions—none of which
settled—the significant rise in settlement after foreign antisuit injunction
denial persisted.215
Likewise, I observed a significant settlement effect within the cases
where courts denied motions to dismiss216 and cases in which dispositive

212 See id. at 697 (“Many commentators note that uncertainty deters settlement.”); John H. Langbein,
The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522, 565 (2012) (“Cases that resist
settlement are typically those in which there is material uncertainty about the relevant legal rules, or in
which the facts remain doubtful despite discovery.”); Rave, supra note 127, at 894 (“[I]f the parties had
perfect information about their likelihood of success, and their ranges of acceptable settlements
overlapped, all rational parties would settle.”). On the other hand, some parties may prefer not to settle if
the resources they have invested in arguing over summary judgment or dismissal will be reusable at later
stages of litigation. See Rave, supra note 127, at 892–93; see also Jonah B. Gelbach, Rethinking Summary
Judgment Empirics: The Life of the Parties, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1663, 1671–73 (2014) (discussing how
the summary judgment standard might influence party behavior, including the likelihood of settlement);
Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on
Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2302–05 (2012) (using an economic litigation model to suggest
that raising the pleading standard—and making dismissals more attainable—could induce some
settlements and prevent others); William H.J. Hubbard, Stalling, Conflict, and Settlement 5 (Aug. 22,
2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Northwestern University Law Review) (explaining that
the threat of “stalling”—i.e., negotiating to delay an adversary’s action—“induces perfectly rational
actors in a symmetric-information context to resort to litigation (which is costly) rather than attempting
to settle out of court for free.”).
213 See Bert I. Huang, Trial by Preview, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1325 (2013) (“The major
‘checkpoints’ of civil procedure—motions to dismiss, class certification, summary judgment—have come
to focus more intently on the merits . . . .”); Rave, supra note 127, at 894 (2006) (“[A] denial of summary
judgment can send a signal that the judge thinks the claim has some merit.”); see also Jonah B. Gelbach,
Material Facts in the Debate over Twombly and Iqbal, 68 STAN. L. REV. 369, 372–77 (2016) (discussing
the apparent impossibility of testing the theoretical relationship between the Rule 12(b)(6) standard and
the merits of underlying cases).
214 See supra Part II.
215 Removing the dispositive-motion-granted cases, twenty-five out of fifty-nine cases settled after a
foreign antisuit injunction grant (42.4%) (95% CI = 29.8–55.0), while forty-five out of fifty-two cases
settled after an injunction denial (86.5%) (95% CI = 77.3–95.8). The confidence intervals do not overlap,
and the p-value is < 0.001.
216 Within the cases where courts denied dispositive motions to dismiss, eighteen out of thirty-three
cases settled after a foreign antisuit injunction grant (54.5%) (95% CI = 37.6–71.5), while twenty-two
out of twenty-six settled after an injunction denial (84.6%) (95% CI = 70.7–98.5). Comparing these
proportions, the p-value is 0.014.
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motions were not filed.217 And I found directional support for the same effect
among cases where courts denied motions for summary judgment, although
the rise in settlement did not quite achieve statistical significance, due to the
small sample size, with a p-value of 0.058.218 The settlement rate rose—
though not significantly—after courts denied dispositive motions compared
with cases where dispositive motions were not filed or not decided.219 Yet
the persistence of the settlement effect after foreign antisuit injunction
denials, notwithstanding decisions on dispositive motions, suggests that
antisuit injunction decisions may have a stronger connection to settlement
than dispositive motion decisions. At least for cases with international
parallel proceedings, the relationship between certainty and settlement
discussed in previous scholarship might not be a complete picture.
G. Future Studies
This study’s findings should encourage future research on the
relationship between international parallel proceedings and settlement. To
confirm and expand on this study’s initial findings, larger samples capturing
additional case characteristics will be helpful. This study measured readily
available data on factors that could have influenced settlement and interfered
with the observed correlation between foreign antisuit injunction denials and
higher settlement rates. In addition to the factors discussed above, I measured
settlement rates by legal standard,220 movant citizenship,221 basis of
217 For the cases where dispositive motions to dismiss were not filed or not decided, seven out of
thirty cases settled after a foreign antisuit injunction grant (23.3%) (95% CI = 8.2–38.5), whereas twentythree out of twenty-nine settled after an injunction denial (79.3%) (95% CI = 64.6–94.1). The p-value is
< 0.001. Then, for cases where summary judgment motions were not filed or not decided, twenty-one out
of fifty-seven cases settled after a foreign antisuit injunction grant (36.8%) (95% CI = 24.3–49.4), while
thirty-two out of thirty-nine settled after a denial (82.1%) (95% CI = 70.0–94.1). The p-value is < 0.001.
218 Within the cases where courts denied dispositive summary judgment motions, four out of nine
settled after a foreign antisuit injunction grant (44.4%) (95% CI = 12.0–76.9), while thirteen out of sixteen
settled after an injunction denial (81.3%) (95% CI = 62.1–100.0). The p-value is 0.058.
219 Forty out of fifty-nine cases settled after a court denied a motion to dismiss (67.8%) (95%
CI = 55.9–79.7), while thirty out of fifty-nine cases settled where a dispositive motion to dismiss was not
filed or not decided (50.8%) (95% CI = 38.1–63.6). The p-value is 0.061. Then, seventeen out of twentyfive cases settled after a court denied a dispositive summary judgment motion (68.0%) (95% CI = 49.7–
86.3), while fifty-three out of ninety-six cases settled where no dispositive summary judgment motion
was filed or decided (55.2%) (95% CI = 45.3–65.2). The p-value is 0.249.
220
Thirty-seven out of seventy-three cases settled in restrictive circuits (50.7%) (95% CI = 39.2–
62.2), and thirty-one out of fifty cases settled in permissive circuits (62.0%) (95% CI = 48.5–75.5). The
difference is not significant, with a p-value of 0.215. Meanwhile, two out of five cases settled in the
undecided Fourth Circuit.
221 There are two ways to code movant citizenship: (1) including movants with both U.S. and foreign
citizenship as U.S.-citizen movants (version one); or (2) counting U.S.-and-foreign-citizen movants as
foreign-citizen movants (version two). For version one, fifty-three out of eighty-nine cases with U.S.-
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jurisdiction,222 and first-filed forum223—none of which produced meaningful
differences in settlement rates. And the foreign antisuit injunction settlement
effect persisted despite legal standard,224 movant citizenship,225 basis of
jurisdiction,226 and first-filed forum.227 But I lacked information to measure
several other potentially influential factors. Three examples follow.

citizen movants for foreign antisuit injunction settled (59.6%) (95% CI = 49.4–69.7), and seventeen out
of thirty-nine cases settled after foreign-only movants sought to enjoin foreign litigation (43.6%) (95%
CI = 28.0–59.2). The difference is not statistically significant: the p-value is 0.095. Then, for version two,
thirty-nine out of seventy cases with U.S.-citizen-only movants settled (55.7%) (95% CI = 44.1–67.4),
and thirty-one out of fifty-eight cases with foreign movants settled (53.4%) (95% CI = 40.6–66.3). Again,
the difference is insignificant, with a p-value of 0.798.
222 Thirty-seven out of seventy federal question cases settled (52.9%) (95% CI = 41.2–64.6), and
thirty-three out of fifty-eight diversity cases settled (56.9%) (95% CI = 44.2–69.6)—an insignificant
difference. The p-value is 0.648.
223 Forty-one out of seventy-seven cases filed first in the United States settled (53.2%) (95%
CI = 42.1–64.4); twenty-eight out of fifty cases filed first abroad settled (56.0%) (95% CI = 42.2–69.8).
Comparing these rates, the p-value is 0.761. One case settled after the parties filed suits in the United
States and abroad on the same day.
224 In restrictive circuits, twelve out of forty cases settled after an antisuit injunction grant (30.0%)
(95% CI = 15.8–44.2), while twenty-five out of thirty-three settled after a denial (75.8%) (95% CI = 61.1–
90.4). The p-value is < 0.001. In permissive circuits, twelve out of twenty-seven cases settled after a grant
(44.4%) (95% CI = 25.7–63.2), compared with nineteen out of twenty-three after a denial (82.6%) (95%
CI = 67.1–98.1). The p-value is 0.006.
225 For U.S.-citizen movants (version one), twenty out of forty-eight cases settled after an antisuit
injunction grant (41.7%) (95% CI = 27.7–55.6), whereas thirty-three out of forty-one settled after a denial
(80.5%) (95% CI = 68.4–92.6). The confidence intervals do not overlap, and the p-value is < 0.001. For
foreign-citizen movants (version one), five out of twenty-two cases settled after an antisuit injunction
grant (22.7%) (95% CI = 5.2–40.2), whereas twelve out of seventeen settled after a denial (70.6%) (95%
CI = 48.9–92.2). The confidence intervals do not overlap, and the p-value is 0.003. Then, for U.S.-citizen
movants (version two), thirteen out of thirty-six cases settled after an antisuit injunction grant (36.1%)
(95% CI = 20.4–51.8), while twenty-six out of thirty-four settled after a denial (76.5%) (95% CI = 62.2–
90.7). Again, the confidence intervals do not overlap, and the p-value is 0.001. For foreign-citizen
movants (version two), twelve out of thirty-four cases settled after an antisuit injunction grant (35.3%)
(95% CI = 19.2–51.4), and nineteen out of twenty-four settled after a denial (79.2%) (95% CI = 62.9–
95.4). The confidence intervals do not overlap, and the p-value is < 0.001. See supra note 221 (explaining
the two ways I coded citizenship).
226 Within federal question cases, eleven out of thirty-eight settled after an antisuit injunction grant
(28.9%) (95% CI = 14.5–43.4), while twenty-six out of thirty-two settled after a denial (81.3%) (95%
CI = 67.1–94.8). The confidence intervals do not overlap, and the p-value is < 0.001. Then, for diversity
cases, fourteen out of thirty-two settled after a grant (43.8%) (95% CI = 26.6–60.9), whereas nineteen out
of twenty-six settled after a denial (73.1%) (95% CI = 56.0–90.1). The p-value is 0.025.
227 For cases first filed in the United States, sixteen out of forty-six settled after an antisuit injunction
grant (36.4%) (95% CI = 16.3–56.5), while twenty-two out of twenty-eight settled after a denial (78.6%)
(95% CI = 63.4–93.8). The confidence intervals do not overlap, and the p-value is < 0.001. And for cases
first filed abroad, eight out of twenty-two settled after a grant (36.4%) (95% CI = 16.3–56.5), while
twenty out of twenty-seven settled after a denial (74.1%) (95% CI = 57.5–90.6). The p-value is 0.008,
and again, the confidence intervals do not overlap.
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1. Domestic Policy Interests
The presence of domestic policy interests could have affected the
results of this study. The enforcement of U.S. law is among the policy
interests courts weigh in deciding motions to enjoin foreign parallel
proceedings.228 And parties often argue that foreign litigation threatens policy
interests.229 The greater the public interest in deciding an issue of domestic
law, the more likely a U.S. court should be to enjoin litigation that threatens
its decision.230 But in practice, courts are far from uniform in weighing such
policy interests.231 Further, some litigants may insist that foreign litigation
threatens domestic policy to advance their preferred outcome—not because
the public policy interest is so important that it would influence their decision
whether to settle.
Courts’ flexibility in weighing domestic policy and the black box of
litigants’ motives in raising policy arguments may complicate efforts to
measure the effect of domestic policy interests on settlement. I do not attempt
to do so here. Nonetheless, domestic policy interests could theoretically
influence both or either the independent variable (foreign antisuit injunction
decision) and dependent variable (settlement). A future study seeking to
measure the effect of domestic policy interests on settlement could develop
a proxy for the importance of asserted policy interests, such as whether a
court rejects or relies on the assertion. Alternatively, surveying litigants
228

Supra Part II.
See, e.g., Huawei Techs., Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 16-cv-02787, 2018 WL 1784065, at *9
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2018) (“Samsung argues that allowing Huawei to enforce the Shenzhen Court’s
injunction would frustrate specific domestic policies against injunctive relief on [standard essential
patents] and general public policies against anticompetitive conduct and breaches of contract.”); E. I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Agfa NV, No. 18-cv-00326, 2018 WL 7283319, at *41 (E.D. Va. Oct. 30,
2018) (“DuPont asserts that the ‘public interest is served by upholding and protecting valid copyrights,
holding parties to their contractual obligations, and preventing unfair and deceptive business practices
and the kinds of damaging business conspiracies in which [defendant] has engaged.’” (quoting Sealed
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order & Preliminary Injunction, E. I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Agfa NV, No. 18-cv-00326 (E.D. Va. June 27, 2018))).
230 See BAE Sys. Tech. Sol. & Servs., Inc. v. Republic of Korea’s Def. Acquisition Program Admin.,
195 F. Supp. 3d 776, 790–91 (D. Md. 2016) (reasoning that “national security surely is a sufficient public
policy . . . to warrant an injunction,” but expressing uncertainty over whether the foreign action
implicated that issue); Teck Metals Ltd. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, No. 05-cv-00411, 2009 WL
4716037, at *3 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2009) (recognizing “Washington’s asserted public interest in . . . its
natural environment”).
231 Compare C.D.S., Inc. v. Bradley Zetler, CDS, LLC, 213 F. Supp. 3d 620, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
(“Although the United States has an important interest in uniform application of its copyright laws, ‘[t]he
presumptive enforceability of forum selection clauses reflects a strong federal public policy of its own.’”
(quoting Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2014))), with Lite On It Corp. v. Toshiba
Corp., No. 07-cv-04758, 2009 WL 10673953, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2009) (“[P]laintiff has proffered
two policies that would be frustrated were defendant allowed to proceed with the enforcement action in
Taiwan: The enforceability of forum selection clauses and notions of finality of judgments. Plaintiff’s
argument is not well-taken.”).
229
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could provide evidence of which public policy interests are most impactful
on decisions to settle or move toward trial.
2. Case Strength
Case strength on the merits may have affected the settlement rates
observed.232 Conclusive findings on the effect of international parallel
proceedings on settlement will require isolating the pressure of litigation
costs from the influence of case quality. Unfortunately, direct data on case
strength were not available for this study’s sample of cases. A future study
might use proxies—such as motion-to-dismiss decisions or responsive
pleadings—to classify cases as either meritorious or nonmeritorious.233 Yet,
the application of U.S. or foreign law can affect case strength,234 which could
weaken a proxy that depends on the pleadings in U.S. court dockets alone.
Substantive knowledge of foreign law seems necessary for a comprehensive
study. To the extent possible, measurements of case strength should account
for differences in applicable foreign law.
3. Asymmetrical Resources
Resource asymmetry could influence settlement rates. The high cost of
litigation may pressure parties with fewer resources to settle, even if the law
is on their side.235 Conversely, some plaintiffs pursue lawsuits against deeper
pocketed defendants in the hopes of extracting a quick settlement.236 If
wealthy litigants tend to hire more expensive attorneys, they may be more
susceptible to settlement pressure through extensive motion practice by

232 Sunshine & Pereyra, supra note 126, at 388 (“Meritorious cases settle at a higher rate than
nonmeritorious cases.”); Eisenberg & Lanvers, supra note 18, at 125 (“Strong filed cases tend to settle;
weak ones do not.”).
233 See Sunshine & Pereyra, supra note 126, at 385 (using unsuccessful motions to dismiss and the
filing of answers to classify cases as “meritorious” or “nonmeritorious”). This study’s sample of cases—
93.0% of which would count as “meritorious” under Sunshine and Pereyra’s test—would require a more
nuanced proxy.
234 See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 945–47 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (observing that U.S. antitrust law “is much more aggressive than British regulation of
restrictive practices”).
235 Alexandra D. Lahav, Symmetry and Class Action Litigation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1494, 1522 (2013)
(“Because a lawsuit is costly and the outcome uncertain, litigants may feel pressure to settle even if the
law is on their side and they stand on equal footing with their opponents. But matters are made worse
when there is significant asymmetrical power distribution.”).
236 See, e.g., Peter Watson, Patent Trolls’ Underhanded Trade Schemes Must Be Stopped, HILL
(Sept. 24, 2021, 1:01 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/573778-its-time-to-stop-patent-trollsunderhanded-schemes-on-trade [https://perma.cc/J4BF-PKLS] (describing the rise of “patent trolls,” or
plaintiffs who file “flimsy” patent claims against large companies, “gambl[ing] that companies would
rather settle quickly than spend years battling toward victory in federal court”).
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opponents with lawyers working on contingency.237 Maybe the amount in
controversy—for which I had limited data238—is a proxy for litigants’
collective resources. And resource asymmetries could be more common in
cases of repetitive litigation.239 But I did not attempt to directly measure
imbalances between parties’ resources. Future studies should try.
Information on the yearly assets, revenues, and profit margins of
publicly owned companies and large private companies is readily
available.240 That information is generally more difficult to find for
individual and smaller organizational litigants. Yet, available information
and reasonable inferences might be sufficient to conduct a meaningful study.
For example, if individual litigants tend to have less money to invest in
litigation than business associations, the type of litigant could serve as a
proxy for resources. Additionally, some judicial opinions take note of
asymmetrical resources.241 So it seems possible—and worthwhile—to
measure the relationship between asymmetrical litigation resources and
settlement.
*

*

*

This study revealed a statistically significant rise in settlement after
foreign antisuit injunction denials.242 But other factors could have contributed
to the trend. While the settlement effect persisted within most of the variables
I measured, data were missing for other potentially influential factors. Larger
studies and regression analysis are necessary for a more compelling
demonstration of the relationship between international parallel proceedings
and settlement.

See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 887 (2d Cir. 1982) (“Derivative suits may be brought for their
nuisance value, the threat of protracted discovery and litigation forcing settlement and payment of fees
even where the underlying suit has modest merit.”); Jordan Rothman, Fighting an Asymmetrical Battle
in Litigation, ABOVE THE L. (July 21, 2021, 1:13 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2021/07/fighting-anasymmetrical-battle-in-litigation [https://perma.cc/2SZV-7TWM] (explaining that small law firms, often
working on contingency, “can sometimes play a war of attrition against larger law firms because each
motion, deposition, discovery demand, and other aspect of litigation may cost the client of a large law
firm several times more than the client of a smaller law firm”).
238
See supra Section IV.E; supra Table 5.
239 See supra Sections I.B, IV.F.
240 See, e.g., Tesla, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 45–95 (Feb. 4, 2022) (reporting Tesla’s
financial performance); HUAWEI INV. & HOLDING CO., 2020 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2021) (self-reporting
the “five-year financial highlights” of Huawei, a private company).
241 See, e.g., Bro-Tech Corp. v. Thermax, Inc., No. 05-cv-02330, 2007 WL 2597618, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 4, 2007) (describing a defendant as “judgment-proof”).
242 Supra Section IV.A; supra Table 1.
237
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In addition to further studies on antisuit injunctions, studies on lis alibi
pendens or forum non conveniens cases would help to confirm or deny the
existence of the settlement effect. Decisions to stay or dismiss—such as
foreign antisuit injunction decisions—either consolidate parallel
proceedings into a single forum or allow duplicative litigation to continue.243
Duplicative litigation creates higher litigation costs, which are likely to
influence settlement. All these decisions—whether to stay, dismiss, or
enjoin—provide certainty to the parties, which can lead to more settlements.
And because these motions do not touch the merits like motions for summary
judgment or Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals do, the resources litigants invest in
these motions are unlikely to save costs in later stages of litigation. In light
of the United States’ world-leading litigation costs,244 I would expect a strong
settlement effect after courts deny motions to stay or dismiss domestic
litigation in favor of foreign proceedings.
Empirical research on settlement rates after state court decisions on
motions to stay or enjoin foreign litigation, or for forum non conveniens
dismissals, would be valuable too. Highlighting differences between state
and federal approaches could further inform the evolution of these doctrines.
V. RESOLVING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Although further research is necessary to determine whether
international parallel proceedings cause settlement rates to rise, this study
has shown a correlation. Even the possibility of abuse of judicial resources
through parallel proceedings should concern readers. Courts could shrug off
the potential of foreign duplicative litigation to exert unfair settlement
pressure as a “cost of doing judicial business,”245 but that would be a mistake.
Further, a uniform legal standard will help facilitate international
commerce.246 So the Supreme Court should resolve the circuit split over
foreign antisuit injunctions in favor of the permissive approach.
The permissive approach, although imperfect, is better than the
restrictive approach.247 As discussed, the restrictive approach places undue
243 See BORN & RUTLEDGE,

supra note 14, at 532.
See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 106, at 2, 3, 6; LAWS. FOR CIV. JUST.
ET AL., supra note 106, at 3.
245
Redish, supra note 29, at 1353 (discussing the burdens and waste of duplicative state and federal
litigation).
246 See Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Tr. Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1355 (6th Cir. 1992) (“International
commerce depends in no small part on the ability of merchants to predict the likely consequences of their
conduct in overseas markets.”).
247 For an argument that the permissive approach favors U.S. movants and is therefore offensive to
foreign nations, see Heim, supra note 115, at 735–41. But cf. Whytock, supra note 119, at 774–75, 788
244
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(and uncertain) weight on international comity.248 Under this approach,
speculative fear of retaliation by foreign sovereigns or respect for
unarticulated foreign policy can overpower the policy interests of U.S. courts
and litigants in fairness, convenience, efficiency, and enforcing U.S. law.249
In some cases, international comity will justify judicial restraint. But the
potential impact of an injunction on foreign relations in those cases will tend
to be obvious from the nature of the issues and the parties’ arguments.250 By
contrast, the intent of the party filing foreign duplicative litigation will be
less so.251 Parties facing settlement pressure may avoid saying so to the court,
which could risk weakening their position in impending negotiations.252
However courts choose to define comity,253 permitting litigants to abuse
foreign judicial resources is an odd form of courtesy.
Returning to Athina Investments Ltd. v. Pinchuk helps illustrate the
problem with the restrictive approach.254 In Athina, the Massachusetts district
court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that foreign parallel litigation
intentionally threatened their financial ability to continue litigating in
Massachusetts.255 But the court failed to articulate how enjoining the parallel
litigation in Moscow might harm the United States’ relations with Russia,
and instead concluded with vague and prophylactic deference to comity—
proclaiming that it could “envision no scenario under which comity would
not carry the day.”256
Indeed, comity led the court to reason that the “Moscow action presents
no direct threat to [the court’s] ability to manage the Massachusetts action

(conducting an empirical study of international choice of law decisions and finding, despite “common
claims of ‘xenophobia’ in U.S. courts, district court judges’ international choice-of-law decisions do not
appear to be systematically biased against foreign litigants”); see also Tan, supra note 21, at 312–13
(suggesting a two-step test that separates the comity inquiry from “other equitable and policy
considerations against which comity cannot be easily analyzed.”).
248 See supra Section I.C.
249 See Weinberg, supra note 67, at 55, 70–71, 74; Ramsey, supra note 67, at 893–94; Paul, supra
note 56, at 56, 68; Tan, supra note 21, at 303–13.
250 Cf., e.g., Bermann, supra note 54, at 608 n.75 (observing that the “Laker case developed into a
full-scale diplomatic episode”).
251 See Vestal, supra note 45, at 526–28 (noting the impossibility of “ascertain[ing] the motivating
factor [behind duplicative litigation] in every case”).
252
Cf. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (“For obvious reasons
[the defendants] did not point out . . . that if mandamus is denied they will be forced to settle—for such
an acknowledgement would greatly weaken them in any settlement negotiations. We should be realistic
about what is feasible to put in a public brief.”).
253 See supra Section I.B.
254 443 F. Supp. 2d 177 (D. Mass. 2006).
255 See id. at 179, 181.
256 Id. at 182.
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and bring it to trial.”257 But that point is far from certain: if the defendant
exhausted the plaintiffs’ resources to litigate, there could be no trial. The
court similarly declared that the foreign duplicative litigation did not
“imperil public policies to an extent that would justify an injunction” in light
of “the forum’s substantial interest in international comity.”258 Yet, that
reasoning undervalued the interests in fair and efficient dispute resolution
that the court shared with the plaintiffs and U.S. taxpayers who fund these
proceedings.259 The district court also failed to clarify whether enjoining
parallel litigation of the private defamation action in the Moscow arbitration
court would have offended Russia. By denying the antisuit injunction
motion, the district court allowed the defendant to pressure the plaintiffs into
settlement within months.260
Similarly, in Bro-Tech Corp. v. Thermax, Inc., a district court sitting
under the restrictive Third Circuit refused to enjoin the plaintiffs’ repetitive
trade-secret litigation in England against an individual defendant, even if it
accepted the defendant’s argument that the purpose of the English action was
to harass him.261 In so ruling, the district court refrained from “question[ing]
the propriety of Plaintiffs’ tactic of naming [the defendant]—who is almost
certainly judgment-proof—in the foreign proceeding.”262 In other words,
forcing a defendant with limited resources to litigate in two forums is fair
game. The court further “recognize[d] . . . that [the defendant] may not have
the financial resources to mount a defense in the English action . . . . Even if
the English action is entirely duplicative, unnecessary, vexatious,
inconvenient, and filed solely for the purpose of harassing [the defendant],”
the court continued, “and he truly cannot participate meaningfully in the
foreign proceeding, these factors would be insufficient to justify an
injunction.”263 Under this reasoning, it is hard to imagine anything that would
justify an injunction. Unsurprisingly, Bro-Tech settled.264
257

See id. at 181.
Id. at 181–82.
259 Id.; cf. Redish, supra note 29, at 1353 (discussing the significant harm that duplicative state and
federal litigations impose on the judicial system and litigants).
260 See Athina, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 178 (“[A]ccording to the plaintiffs, the Moscow action is nothing
more than a backdoor attempt . . . to subvert their Massachusetts action by placing extreme financial
pressure on Mr. Kolomoisky.”); Notice of Dismissal, Athina Invs. Ltd. v. Pinchuk, No. 06-cv-10560 (D.
Mass. Nov. 24, 2006); Bochetto, supra note 1.
261 See No. 05-cv-02330, 2007 WL 2597618, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2007).
262 Id.
263 Id.
264 Stipulated Order of Dismissal, Bro-Tech Corp. v. Thermax Inc., No. 05-cv-02330 (E.D. Pa. Feb.
23, 2010); Ryan Davis, Thermax to Pay $38M to Settle Purolite Secrets Case, LAW360 (Feb. 24, 2010,
1:57 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/151744/thermax-to-pay-38m-to-settle-purolite-secrets-case
258
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Permissive courts, on the other hand, would likely have reached the
opposite result from Athina or Bro-Tech.265 One recent example is Huawei
Technologies Co. v. Samsung Electronics Co.,266 a 2018 decision from the
Northern District of California, which sits in the permissive Ninth Circuit.
During the case, Samsung filed a motion to enjoin Huawei from enforcing a
Chinese court’s order that Samsung was infringing two of Huawei’s patents;
in that context, Huawei’s vice president bragged that the company uses
lawsuits as a “bargaining chip.”267
The district court found that the foreign proceeding “interefere[d] with
‘equitable considerations’ by compromising the court’s ability to reach a just
result . . . free of external pressure on [Samsung] to” settle.268 Even without
evidence that Samsung lacked the resources to continue litigating in both the
domestic and foreign forum—the situation the Athina plaintiffs faced—the
Huawei district court granted the antisuit injunction motion.269 Likewise, in
Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., the Ninth Circuit granted a foreign antisuit
injunction after expressing the same concern that a parallel proceeding would
lead to a pressured settlement in a patent dispute.270
Athina and Bro-Tech may be two of many cases in which denying relief
from international parallel litigation has facilitated unfair settlement
pressure.271 Even without further empirical evidence of the connection
between foreign antisuit injunction denials and settlement, the case studies
above suggest that the restrictive approach’s prophylactic comity reflex is

[https://perma.cc/S88H-BVDF] (reporting that Thermax’s decision to settle stemmed in part from “the
cost and time involved in protracted litigation”).
265 See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 889 (9th Cir. 2012) (“‘At most, there
are competing comity concerns, so it cannot fairly be said’ that the district court’s [foreign antisuit]
injunction ‘would have an intolerable impact on comity.’” (quoting Applied Med. Dist. Corp. v. Surgical
Co. BV, 587 F.3d 909, 921 (9th Cir. 2009))); Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir.
1996) (declining “to require a district court to genuflect before a vague and omnipotent notion of comity
every time that it must decide whether to enjoin a foreign action”). But see Indus. Mar. Carriers (Bah.),
Inc. v. Barwil Agencies A.S., Nos. 03-cv-01668, 03-cv-01908, 2003 WL 22533704, at *4–5 (E.D. La.
Nov. 5, 2003) (denying foreign antisuit injunction over movant’s argument that its “very survival . . .
[was] at stake,” and finding that “even if there was an adequate showing that the execution of the Turkish
Judgment would cause the [movant’s] insolvency . . . , that alone . . . would not tilt the scales in favor of”
enjoining it).
266
No. 16-cv-02787, 2018 WL 1784065 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2018).
267 Id. at *10–11.
268 Id. at *10 (quoting Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 886).
269 Id. at *12.
270 Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 886, 889.
271 See supra Part IV (showing that the settlement rate is significantly higher in cases where courts
deny foreign antisuit injunction motions than in cases where courts grant relief from international parallel
proceedings).

1626

116:1577 (2022)

Foreign Antisuit Injunctions and the Settlement Effect

unfair.272 Thus, courts should require, in the Seventh Circuit’s words, “some
indication that the issuance of an injunction really would throw a monkey
wrench, however small, into the foreign relations of the United States.”273
Permissive circuits have proven more adept than restrictive circuits at
weighing international-comity concerns with an eye toward realism.274
As the cases above suggest, litigants in the permissive circuits seem to
have greater assurance that the resolution of their dispute will depend on the
merits of the case, rather than on their adversaries’ capacity to pursue
duplicative litigation abroad. Further, the permissive approach may deter
litigants from harassing opponents and abusing judicial resources with
parallel suits. Again, I do not argue that settlement is bad—only that a higher
settlement rate after foreign antisuit injunction denials suggests potential
abuse of duplicative litigation to pressure unfair settlements.275 Disfavoring
injunctions in reliance on a blanket international-comity principle drains
resources from litigants and courts—both domestic and foreign—and
encourages misuse of international parallel proceedings. At the next
opportunity, the Supreme Court should adopt the permissive approach.
Meanwhile, this study’s early evidence of the connection between foreign
duplicative litigation and settlement should encourage larger studies of the
settlement effect.
CONCLUSION
International parallel proceedings seem to be a powerful vehicle for
pressuring opponents into settlement. This empirical study suggests that
when courts deny foreign antisuit injunction motions, settlement rates rise
significantly—at least in cases with opinions available on Westlaw, Lexis,
and in the Federal Supplement. Overall, the trend persists across other
factors, including case type, amount in controversy, the repetitive or reactive
nature of parallel suits, and dispositive motion decisions. Based on observed
differences between published and unpublished opinions, I would expect the

272 See supra notes 67–80 and accompanying text (arguing that comity is vague, difficult to balance
against unrelated policy interests, and awkward to transplant from domestic to international parallel
proceedings).
273 Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 431 (7th Cir. 1993).
274 For example, in Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 887 (citing Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 10 F.3d at 431), the
court compared Applied Med. Dist. Corp. v. Surgical Co., 587 F.3d 909, 921 (9th Cir. 2009), with E. &
J. Gallo Winery v. Andina Licores S.A., 446 F.3d 984, 994 (9th Cir. 2006), observing that the weight
comity deserves is fact-specific—it is greater, for example, where the State Department has expressed
foreign relations concerns than it is in an ordinary transnational contract dispute. This approach aligns
with the Supreme Court’s discussion of comity in Animal Science Prods., Inc. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm.
Co., 138 S. Ct. 1865, 1873 (2018). See supra note 69.
275 Supra notes 108–128 and accompanying text.
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settlement effect to be more extreme in unavailable cases. Yet, larger and
more sophisticated studies are necessary to disentangle the potential
settlement effect of foreign antisuit injunction denials from the influence of
other variables. Although this study lacked information on potentially
influential factors, the results urge further research on international parallel
proceedings and settlement.
Further, individual case studies show that the restrictive approach to
foreign antisuit injunction motions—now dominant in the divided federal
circuit courts—overvalues vague and inconsistent notions of international
comity at the expense of more concrete interests in efficiency and fairness.
Under the restrictive test, waste and inconvenience are certain, and unfair
settlement pressure seems easy to inflict. In contrast, the permissive
approach is fairer: by tasking the nonmoving party with demonstrating actual
comity infringement, permissive courts discourage abuse of foreign
duplicative litigation to pressure unfair settlements.
Of course, in some cases, issuing a foreign antisuit injunction may risk
offending a foreign nation. But the burden of proving this abstract danger
should be on the party opposing the more efficient result. In cases
implicating severe foreign relations concerns, those concerns are likely to be
apparent. By contrast, distinguishing between legitimate and exploitative
foreign duplicative litigation is difficult. Accordingly, the Supreme Court
should resolve the circuit split in favor of the permissive approach. In doing
so, the Court would limit exploitative litigation in transnational disputes and
set a predictable backdrop for fair and efficient settlement negotiation.
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APPENDIX: CASES WITH FOREIGN ANTISUIT INJUNCTION
DECISION BY FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS, 2000–2020
This Appendix lists the 128 cases from Westlaw and Lexis that I
collected into an original sample and coded. Table A1 provides a complete
picture of the information I recorded.276

276 The cases listed in Table A1 are also available online in CSV and XLSX formats, at
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/nulr/vol116/iss6/4/.
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TABLE A1: CASES
Case

Docket
No.

ASI or Stay
Granted or
Denied

Settlement? And
Disposition if No
Settlement

Appeal

Motion to
Dismiss

Summary
Judgment
Motion

Foreign
Forum(s)

1st Source Bank v.
Neto, 2016 WL
7187247 (N.D. Ind.
Dec. 12, 2016)

15-cv00261

ASI denied

No. Summary
judgment for
plaintiff.

7th Cir.
affirmed

None

Granted

Brazil

2d Cir.
affirmed
ASI

Denied

Denied in
part

Panama;
Guatemala

A.P. Moller-Maersk
A/S v. Ocean Express
Miami, 590 F. Supp. 2d
526 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)

06-cv02778

ASI granted

No. Partial
summary judgment
for plaintiff;
voluntary dismissal
of remaining
claims.

Abbot Lab’ys v. Qiagen
Gaithersburg, Inc.,
2010 WL 1539952
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 15,
2010)

10-cv00712

ASI denied

Yes.

No appeal
(7th Cir.)

None

None

Germany

Affymax, Inc. v.
Johnson & Johnson,
420 F. Supp. 2d 876
(N.D. Ill. 2006)

04-cv06216

ASI granted

Yes.

No appeal
on ASI (7th
Cir.)

Denied

None

Germany

Albemarle Corp. v.
AstraZeneca UK Ltd.,
2009 WL 10690496
(D.S.C. Sept. 9, 2009)

08-cv01085

ASI
granted;
vacated

No. Judgment for
defendant.

4th Cir.
affirmed

Partial
motion
granted

Filed;
mooted

U.S.

Allied Van Lines, Inc.
v. Beamen, 2008 WL
4866052 (N.D. Ill. July
21, 2008)

07-cv02407

ASI denied;
motion to
dismiss
granted

No. Dismissal for
lack of personal
jurisdiction.

No appeal
(7th Cir.)

Granted

None

Canada

Alstom Chile S.A. v.
Mapfre Compania De
Seguros Generales
Chile S.A., 2013 WL
5863547 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 31, 2013)

13-cv02416

ASI granted

No. Judgment for
plaintiff,
compelling
arbitration.

Appeal
withdrawn
(2d Cir.)

None

None

Chile

Amaprop Ltd. v.
Indiabulls Fin. Servs.
Ltd., 2010 WL 1050988
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23,
2010)

10-cv01853

ASI granted

No. Judgment for
plaintiff,
compelling
arbitration.

No appeal
on ASI (2d
Cir.)

None

None

India

Answers in Genesis of
Ky., Inc. v. Creation
Ministries Int’l, Ltd.,
2009 WL 10706843
(E.D. Ky. Mar. 27,
2009)

08-cv00053

Renewed
ASI motion
denied

Yes.

Decision on
earlier ASI
motion
affirmed
(6th Cir.)

Denied

None

Australia
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Filed First
(U.S. or
Abroad)

Basis of
Jurisdiction

Case Type

Amount in
Controversy

Citizenship
of Plaintiff

U.S.

Diversity

Contract

$4,659,644

U.S.

Brazil

Defendant

Repetitive

Panama

Federal
question;
admiralty and
maritime

Contract

$8,415,000

Denmark

U.S.;
Guatemala

Plaintiff

Reactive

Germany

Diversity

Contract;
arbitration

Unknown
(over
$75,000)

U.S.;
Germany

U.S.

Plaintiff

Reactive

Germany

Federal
question

Patent

Unknown

U.S.

U.S.

Defendant

Repetitive

England

Diversity

Contract

Unknown
(over
$75,000)

U.S.

U.K.

Plaintiff

Reactive

Canada

Federal
question

Other;
statutory;
contract

$78,935

U.S.

Canada

Plaintiff

Reactive

Chile

Federal
question

Arbitration

Unknown

Chile; France

Chile

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Federal
question

Arbitration

Unknown

Cayman
Islands

India

Plaintiff

Reactive

Australia

Federal
question

Contract;
arbitration

Unknown

U.S.

Australia

Plaintiff

Reactive

Citizenship Party Seeking
of Defendant
ASI

Repetitive
or Reactive
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Case

Docket
No.

ASI or Stay
Granted or
Denied

Settlement? And
Disposition if No
Settlement

Appeal

Motion to
Dismiss

Summary
Judgment
Motion

Foreign
Forum(s)

Applied Med. Distrib.
Corp. v. Ah Sung Int’l,
Inc., 2016 WL 7626488
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 20,
2016)

14-cv01900

ASI granted

Yes. Default
judgment for
plaintiff.

No appeal
(9th Cir.)

Denied

Partial
motion
granted in
part

South Korea

APR Energy, LLC v.
First Inv. Grp., 88 F.
Supp. 3d 1300 (M.D.
Fla. 2015)

14-cv00575

ASI granted

No. Judgment for
plaintiff.

No appeal
on ASI
(11th Cir.)

None

None

Libya

Aruba Hotel Enters.
N.V. v. Belfonti, 611 F.
Supp. 2d 203 (D. Conn.
2009)

07-cv01297

ASI denied;
summary
judgment
granted

No. Cross-motions
for summary
judgment granted;
judgment for
plaintiffs.

No appeal
(2d Cir.)

Denied

Granted

Aruba

Athina Invs. Ltd. v.
Pinchuk, 443 F. Supp.
2d 177 (D. Mass. 2006)

06-cv10560

ASI denied

Yes.

No appeal
on ASI (1st
Cir.)

Granted;
vacated

None

Russia

BAE Sys. Tech. Sol. &
Servs., Inc. v. Republic
of Korea’s Def.
Acquisition Program
Admin., 195 F. Supp.
3d 776 (D. Md. 2016)

14-cv03551

ASI granted

No. Summary
judgment for
plaintiff.

4th Cir.
dismissed

Denied

Granted

South Korea

Bailey Shipping Ltd. v.
Am. Bureau of
Shipping, 2013 WL
5312540 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 23, 2013)

12-cv05959

ASI granted

No. Judgment for
plaintiff,
confirming
arbitration award.

No appeal
(2d Cir.)

None

None

Greece

Banco Intercontinental,
S.A. v. Renta, 2005 WL
8168711 (S.D. Fla. Apr.
12, 2005)

04-cv20727

ASI denied

Yes. Default
judgment for
plaintiff.

No appeal
on ASI
(11th Cir.)

Denied

Denied

Dominican
Republic

Bank Leumi USA v.
Ehrlich, 2015 WL
12591663 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 23, 2015)

12-cv04423

ASI granted

No. Summary
judgment for
plaintiff.

No appeal
(2d Cir.)

Denied

Granted

Uruguay

Barnie’s Coffee & Tea
Co. v. Am. Mattress
Co., 2008 WL 191019
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 22,
2008)

07-cv01664

ASI denied

Yes.

No appeal
(11th Cir.)

None

None

Kuwait
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Filed First
(U.S./
Abroad)

Basis of
Jurisdiction

Case Type

Amount in
Controversy

Citizenship
of Plaintiff

U.S.

Diversity

Contract

Unknown
(over
$75,000)

U.S.

South Korea

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Federal
question

Contract;
arbitration

Unknown

U.S.

Libya; St.
Vincent;
Grenadine

Plaintiff

Reactive

Aruba

Diversity

Contract;
commercial

Unknown

Aruba

U.S.

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Federal
question

Other;
racketeering

Unknown
(over $100
million)

Belize;
Cyprus; Israel

Ukraine;
Switzerland;
U.S.

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Federal
question

Contract

$43.25
million

U.S.

Korea

Plaintiff

Reactive

Greece

Federal
question

Arbitration

$168,090

Marshall
Islands

U.S.; Greece

Defendant

Repetitive

U.S.

Federal
question

Other;
racketeering

Unknown
(over $176
million)

Dominican
Republic

U.S.;
Dominican
Republic;
British Virgin
Islands

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Diversity

Contract

Unknown
(over
$75,000)

U.S.

Uruguay

Plaintiff

Reactive

Kuwait

Federal
question

Trademark;
contract

Unknown
(over
$75,000)

U.S.

Kuwait

Plaintiff

Reactive

Citizenship Party Seeking
of Defendant
ASI

Repetitive
or Reactive
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Docket
No.

ASI or Stay
Granted or
Denied

Settlement? And
Disposition if No
Settlement

Appeal

Motion to
Dismiss

Summary
Judgment
Motion

Foreign
Forum(s)

Bayco Prods., Inc. v.
ProTorch Co.,
2020 WL 2574626
(E.D. Tex. May 21,
2020)

19-cv00648

ASI denied
as moot;
motion to
dismiss and
compel
arbitration
granted

No. Motion to
dismiss and compel
arbitration granted.

No appeal
(5th Cir.)

Granted

None

China

BCB Holdings Ltd. v.
Gov’t of Belize, 232 F.
Supp. 3d 28 (D.D.C.
2017)

14-cv01123

ASI denied
without
prejudice;
judgment
for movant

No. Judgment for
plaintiff,
confirming
arbitration award.

No appeal
on ASI
(D.C. Cir.)

Denied

Denied

Belize

BlackBerry Ltd. v.
Nokia Corp., 2018 WL
5630584 (D. Del. Oct.
31, 2018)

17-cv00155

ASI denied

Yes.

No appeal
(3d Cir.)

Filed; not
decided

None

Sweden

Blom, ASA v.
Pictometry Int’l Corp.,
2011 WL 13210083
(W.D.N.Y. July 19,
2011)

10-cv06607

ASI denied

Yes.

No appeal
(2d Cir.)

None

None

Norway

Broadspire, Inc. v.
Momentum Advanced
Sols., Inc., 2010 WL
11597280 (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 26, 2010)

09-cv08607

ASI denied

Yes.

No appeal
(9th Cir.)

Granted in
part; denied
in part

None

Canada

Bro-Tech Corp. v.
Thermax, Inc.,
2007 WL 2597618
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2007)

05-cv02330

ASI denied

Yes.

No appeal
(3d Cir.)

Denied

Denied

England

C.D.S., Inc. v. Bradley
Zetler, CDS, LLC,
213 F. Supp. 3d 620
(S.D.N.Y. 2016)

16-cv03199

ASI denied

Yes.

No appeal
on ASI
(2d Cir.)

Partial
motion
denied

Denied

France

Canon Latin Am. Inc.
v. Lantech (CR), S.A.,
497 F. Supp. 2d 1370
(S.D. Fla. 2007); Canon
Latin Am. Inc. v.
Lantech (CR), S.A.,
453 F. Supp. 2d 1357
(S.D. Fla. 2006)

05-cv20297

ASI
granted;
reversed

No. Final summary
judgment for
plaintiff.

11th Cir.
reversed

Denied

Crossmotions
denied in
part

Costa Rica

Cascade Yarns, Inc. v.
Knitting Fever, Inc.,
2014 WL 5312571
(W.D. Wash. Oct. 16,
2014)

10-cv00861

ASI denied

No. Judgment as a
matter of law for
plaintiff.

No appeal
on ASI
(9th Cir.)

Denied in
part

Denied in
part

Italy; Spain

Case
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Filed First
(U.S./
Abroad)

Basis of
Jurisdiction

Case Type

Amount in
Controversy

Citizenship
of Plaintiff

U.S.

Federal
question

Patent;
contract

Unknown

U.S.

U.S.; China

Plaintiff

Reactive

Belize

Federal
question

Other;
arbitration

BZ$
40,843,272

Belize

Belize

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Federal
question

Patent

Unknown

Canada

Finland

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Diversity

Contract;
arbitration

Unknown

Norway

U.S.

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Diversity

Contract

$637,939

U.S.

Canada

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Federal
question

Other;
statutory;
contract

Unknown
($38 million
settlement)

U.S.; U.K.

U.S.; India;
U.K.

Defendant

Repetitive

U.S.

Federal
question

Copyright;
trademark;
contract; tort

Unknown
(over
$1,000,000)

U.S.

U.S.; South
Africa

Plaintiff

Reactive

Costa Rica

Diversity

Contract

$247,000

U.S.

Costa Rica

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Federal
question

Trademark;
RICO; tort

Unknown

U.S.

U.S.;
England; Italy

Plaintiff

Reactive

Citizenship Party Seeking
of Defendant
ASI

Repetitive
or Reactive
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Case

Docket
No.

ASI or Stay
Granted or
Denied

Settlement? And
Disposition if No
Settlement

Appeal

Motion to
Dismiss

Summary
Judgment
Motion

Foreign
Forum(s)

CFTC v. Lake Shore
Asset Mgmt. Ltd.,
2007 WL 2915647
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 2007)

07-cv03598

ASI granted
through
appointment
of receiver

No.

No appeal
on ASI
(7th Cir.)

Filed; not
decided

Filed; not
decided

England

Citibank, N.A. v.
Mazza, 2020 WL
7493080 (S.D. Fla. Feb.
12, 2020)

19-cv21216

ASI
granted;
arbitration
compelled

No. Arbitration
compelled.

No appeal
(11th Cir.)

Denied

None

Argentina

Commercializadora
Portimex, S.A. de CV
v. Zen-Noh Grain
Corp., 373 F. Supp. 2d
645 (E.D. La. 2005)

02-cv01185

ASI granted

No. Judgment for
defendant.

No appeal
(5th Cir.)

None

Partial
motion
granted

Mexico

Comverse, Inc. v. Am.
Telecomms., Inc.,
2006 WL 3016315
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23,
2006)

06-cv06825

ASI denied

Yes.

No appeal
(2d Cir.)

None

None

Chile

Cont’l Cas. Co. v. AXA
Glob. Risks Ltd.,
2010 WL 1268038
(W.D. Mo. Apr. 2,
2010)

09-cv00335

ASI denied;
stay denied

Yes.

No appeal
on ASI
(8th Cir.)

Denied

Filed; not
decided

England

Custom Polymers PET
v. Gamma Meccanica
SpA, 185 F. Supp. 3d
741 (D.S.C. 2016)

15-cv04882

ASI granted

Yes.

4th Cir.
dismissed

None

None

Italy

Cybernaut Cap. Mgmt.
Ltd. v. Partners Grp.
Access Secondary
2008, L.P., 2013 WL
4413754 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 7, 2013)

13-cv05380

ASI denied

No. Judgment for
defendant.

Appeal
withdrawn
(2d Cir.)

None

None

Cayman
Islands

Dandong v. Pinnacle
Performance Ltd.,
2011 WL 6156743
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12,
2011)

10-cv08086

ASI granted

Yes.

2d Cir.
affirmed
ASI

Granted in
part; denied
in part

None

Singapore

David Benrimon Fine
Art LLC v. Durazzo,
2017 WL 4857603
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26,
2017)

17-cv06382

ASI denied

Yes.

No appeal
(2d Cir.)

None

None

France
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Filed First
(U.S./
Abroad)

Basis of
Jurisdiction

Case Type

Amount in
Controversy

Citizenship
of Plaintiff

U.S.

Federal
question

Other;
statutory

$130,000

U.S.

U.S.

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Federal
question

Other;
employment;
arbitration

Unknown

U.S.;
Argentina

Argentina

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Diversity

Contract

$4,000,000

Mexico

U.S.

Defendant

Repetitive

U.S.

Diversity

Contract;
arbitration

Unknown
(over
$75,000)

U.S.

Chile

Plaintiff

Reactive

England

Diversity

Contract;
insurance

$23 million

U.S.

England; Italy

Plaintiff

Reactive

Italy

Diversity

Contract

Unknown
(over
$75,000)

U.S.

Italy

Plaintiff

Reactive

Cayman
Islands

Federal
question

Arbitration

Unknown

Cayman
Islands

U.S.;
Scotland;
Guernsey;
Luxembourg

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Diversity

Securities;
tort;
contract;
class action

Unknown

Singapore

Cayman
Islands;
Singapore;
England;
Wales

Plaintiff

Reactive

France

Diversity

Contract

$347,500

U.S.

France

Plaintiff

Reactive

Citizenship Party Seeking
of Defendant
ASI

Repetitive
or Reactive
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Case

Docket
No.

ASI or Stay
Granted or
Denied

Settlement? And
Disposition if No
Settlement

Appeal

Motion to
Dismiss

Summary
Judgment
Motion

Foreign
Forum(s)

Deutsche Mex.
Holdings S.a.r.l. v.
Accendo Banco, S.A.,
2019 WL 5257995
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17,
2019)

19-cv08692

ASI granted

No. Judgment for
plaintiff,
compelling
arbitration.

No appeal
(2d Cir.)

None

None

Mexico

Dow Jones & Co. v.
Harrods, Ltd., 237 F.
Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y.
2002)

02-cv03979

ASI denied;
motion to
dismiss
granted

No. Dismissal for
lack of personal and
subject matter
jurisdiction.

2d Cir.
affirmed

Granted

None

U.K.

Dr. Byte USA, LLC v.
Storex Indus. Corp.,
2008 WL 11333115
(S.D. Fla. Feb. 21,
2008)

07-cv80379

ASI denied

No. Motion to
compel arbitration
denied.

No appeal
(11th Cir.)

None

None

Canada

E. & J. Gallo Winery v.
Andina Licores S.A.,
2005 WL 1554001
(E.D. Cal. June 24,
2005)

05-cv00101

ASI denied;
reversed

Yes.

9th Cir.
reversed

Denied

Denied in
part

Ecuador

E. I. duPont de
Nemours & Co. v. Agfa
NV, 2018 WL 7283319
(E.D. Va. Oct. 30,
2018)

18-cv00326

ASI denied

Yes.

No appeal
(4th Cir.)

Granted in
part

None

Germany

Denied;
motion to
dismiss
third-party
complaint
granted

Partial
motion
granted

China

Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Asia Optical Co.,
118 F. Supp. 3d 581
(S.D.N.Y. 2015)

11-cv00636

ASI granted

Yes. Judgment for
plaintiff; voluntary
dismissal of appeal.

Appeal on
ASI
withdrawn
(2d Cir.)

ED Cap. LLC v.
Bloomfield Inv. Res.
Corp., 155 F. Supp. 3d
434 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)

15-cv09056

ASI denied

No. Dismissal for
failure to state a
claim.

No appeal
on ASI
(2d Cir.)

Granted

None

Netherlands

eLandia Int’l, Inc. v.
Koy, 2009 WL
10667894 (S.D. Fla.
Aug. 24, 2009)

09-cv20588

ASI denied

Yes.

No appeal
(11th Cir.)

Denied

Granted in
part; denied
in part

Fiji

Empresa Generadora de
Electricidad Itabo, S.A.
v. Corporación
Dominica de Empresas
Eléctricas Estatales,
2005 WL 1705080
(S.D.N.Y. July 18,
2005)

05-cv05004

ASI denied

Yes. Appeal
withdrawn;
stipulated
dismissal.

Appeal
withdrawn
(2d Cir.)

None

None

Dominican
Republic
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Filed First
(U.S./
Abroad)

Basis of
Jurisdiction

Case Type

Amount in
Controversy

Citizenship
of Plaintiff

Mexico

Federal
question

Arbitration;
contract

Unknown

Mexico;
Germany

Mexico

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.K.

Federal
question

Tort

Unknown

U.S.

U.K.

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Diversity

Arbitration;
contract

Unknown
(over
$75,000)

U.S.

Canada

Plaintiff

Reactive

Ecuador

Diversity

Contract

Unknown
(over
$217,000)

U.S.

Ecuador

Plaintiff

Reactive

Germany

Federal
question

Patent

Unknown

U.S.

Belgium

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Federal
question

Contract

Unknown
(over
$75,000)

U.S.

Taiwan

Plaintiff

Reactive

Netherlands

Diversity

Contract

Unknown
(over
$75,000)

U.S.

British Virgin
Islands;
Bermuda

Plaintiff

Reactive

Fiji

Diversity

Contract

$7,500,000

U.S.

U.S.; Fiji;
New Zealand;
Canada

Plaintiff

Reactive

Dominican
Republic

Federal
question

Arbitration

Unknown

Dominican
Republic

Dominican
Republic

Plaintiff

Reactive

Citizenship Party Seeking Repetitive or
of Defendant
ASI
Reactive
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Case

Docket
No.

ASI or Stay
Granted or
Denied

Settlement? And
Disposition if No
Settlement

Appeal

Motion to
Dismiss

Summary
Judgment
Motion

Foreign
Forum(s)

En Pointe Techs. Sales,
LLC v. Ovex Techs.
(Priv.) Ltd., 2017 WL
10057506 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 8, 2017)

17-cv04362

ASI granted

No. Judgment for
plaintiff,
compelling
arbitration.

No appeal
(9th Cir.)

None

None

Pakistan

Escalo v. Steiner
Transocean, Ltd.,
2015 WL 12533114
(S.D. Fla. Dec. 15,
2015)

13-cv21065

ASI denied

Yes.

No appeal
(11th Cir.)

Denied

Denied

Philippines

Fellowes, Inc. v.
Changzhou Xinrui
Fellowes Off. Equip.
Co., 2012 WL 3544841
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 16,
2012)

11-cv06289

ASI
granted;
vacated

No. Dismissal for
lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.

7th Cir.
vacated

None

None

China

Fisher & Co., Inc. v.
Fine Blanking & Tool
Co., 2019 WL 5853539
(E.D. Mich. Nov. 8,
2019)

19-cv10665

ASI denied

Yes.

No appeal
(6th Cir.)

None

None

Taiwan

Gen. Elec. Co. v. Deutz
AG, 129 F. Supp. 2d
776 (W.D. Pa. 2000)

98-cv00370

ASI
granted;
reversed

Yes.

3d Cir.
reversed

Denied

None

London

14-cv03254

ASI granted

No. Judgment for
plaintiff.

No appeal
on ASI
(9th Cir.)

None

Partial
motion
granted in
part; denied
in part

Lebanon

00-cv00035

ASI
granted;
reversed

No. Preliminary
injunction vacated;
dismissal for
mootness.

8th Cir.
reversed

Denied

Denied

Japan

Grynberg v. BP P.L.C.,
643 F. Supp. 2d 1
(D.D.C. 2009)

08-cv00301

ASI denied

No. Dismissal
pursuant to
arbitration.

No appeal
on ASI
(D.C. Cir.)

Granted

None

Canada

Hans Vlessing Int’l
Textile Agencies, Inc.
v. Daewoo Int’l Corp.,
2008 WL 114707367
(N.D. Ga. Apr. 24,
2008)

07-cv02421

ASI granted

Yes.

No appeal
on ASI
(11th Cir.)

Denied

None

South Korea

Gilbane Fed. v. United
Infrastructure Projects
FZCO, 2014 WL
4950011 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 24, 2014)
Goss Int’l Corp. v.
Tokyo Kikai
Seisakusho, Ltd.,
2007 WL 2301266
(N.D. Iowa Aug. 8,
2007); Goss Int’l Corp.
v. Tokyo Kikai
Seisakusho, Ltd., 435 F.
Supp. 2d 919 (N.D.
Iowa 2006)
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Filed First
(U.S./
Abroad)

Basis of
Jurisdiction

Case Type

Amount in
Controversy

Citizenship
of Plaintiff

Pakistan

Federal
question

Contract;
arbitration

Unknown

U.S.

Pakistan

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Diversity

Tort;
contract;
employment
; statutory

Unknown
(over
$75,000)

Unknown

U.S.

Plaintiff

Reactive

China

Diversity

Contract

$100 million

U.S.

China

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Diversity

Contract

Unknown
(over
$75,000)

U.S.

Taiwan

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Diversity

Contract

$80 million

U.S.

Germany

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Diversity

Contract

$7 million

U.S.

United Arab
Emirates

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Federal
question

Other;
statutory

Unknown
(over $30
million)

U.S.

Japan; U.S.

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Federal
question

Other;
racketeering

$6,075,000

U.S.

U.S.;
Norway;
England;
U.K.

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Diversity

Contract

$750,000

U.S.

South Korea

Plaintiff

Reactive

Citizenship Party Seeking
of Defendant
ASI

Repetitive
or Reactive
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Docket
No.

Case

ASI or Stay
Granted or
Denied

Settlement? And
Disposition if No
Settlement

Appeal

Summary
Judgment
Motion

Foreign
Forum(s)

None

Denied

Various (ASI
sought
against all
foreign
actions)

Motion to
Dismiss

Hapag-Lloyd
Aktiengesellschaft v.
U.S. Oil Trading
L.L.C., 2016 WL
5369617 (S.D.N.Y.
May 6, 2016)

14-cv09949

ASI granted

Yes.

2d Cir.
remanded;
district
court
reaffirmed
ASI

H-D Mich., LLC v.
Hellenic Duty Free
Shops S.A., 2012 WL
404895 (E.D. Wis. Feb.
7, 2012)

11-cv00742

ASI granted

Yes.

7th Cir.
affirmed

None

None

Greece

Home Healthcare
Affiliates of Miss., Inc.
v. N. Am. Indem. N.V.,
2003 WL 22244382
(N.D. Miss. Aug. 7,
2003)

01-cv00489

ASI granted

Yes.

No appeal
on ASI
(5th Cir.)

Denied

Denied in
part

Belgium

Huawei Techs., Co. v.
Samsung Elecs. Co.,
2018 WL 1784065
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 13,
2018)

16-cv02787

ASI granted

Yes.

No appeal
on ASI
(9th Cir.)

Denied

Filed; not
decided

China

Ibeto Petrochemical
Indus., Ltd. v. M/T
“Beffen,” 412 F. Supp.
2d 285 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
21, 2005)

05-cv02590

ASI
granted;
stayed in
favor of
foreign
arbitration

Yes.

2d Cir.
affirmed in
part

Denied

Filed; not
decided

Nigeria;
England

ICBC Standard Sec.,
Inc. v. Luzuriaga,
217 F. Supp. 3d 733
(S.D.N.Y. 2016)

15-cv05267

ASI denied;
dismissed in
favor of
foreign
proceeding

No. Dismissal,
abstaining in favor
of foreign litigation.

No appeal
(2d Cir.)

Granted

None

Argentina

Ilyia v. El Khoury,
2014 WL 12683678
(W.D. Wash. May 16,
2014)

11-cv01593

ASI granted

No. Jury verdict for
defendant.

No appeal
on ASI
(9th Cir.)

Denied

Denied

Lebanon

In re Karaha Bodas Co.
v. Perusahaan
Pertambangan Minyak
Dan Gas Bumi Negara,
465 F. Supp. 2d 283
(S.D.N.Y. 2006)

21-mc00098

ASI granted

No. Judgment for
plaintiff.

2d Cir.
affirmed

Motion to
dismiss
appeal
denied

None

Cayman
Islands

In re Lernout &
Hauspie Sec. Litig.,
2003 WL 22964378 (D.
Mass. Dec. 12, 2003)

00-cv11589

ASI granted

Yes.

1st Cir.
affirmed

Denied

None

Belgium
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Filed First
(U.S./
Abroad)

Basis of
Jurisdiction

Case Type

Amount in
Controversy

Citizenship
of Plaintiff

U.S.

Federal
question;
admiralty and
maritime

Contract

Unknown

Germany

U.S.

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Diversity

Contract

Unknown
(over
$75,000)

U.S.

Greece

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Diversity

Contract;
insurance

$300,000

U.S.

Belgium; U.S.

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Federal
question

Patent

Unknown

China; U.S.

South Korea;
U.S.

Defendant

Repetitive

Nigeria

Federal
question;
admiralty and
maritime

Contract;
Shipping

$2,000,000

Nigeria

Norway

Defendant

Repetitive

Argentina

Diversity

Contract

Unknown
(over
$75,000)

U.S.

Argentina

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Diversity

Contract

Unknown
(over
$75,000)

U.S.

U.S.; Lebanon

Defendant

Repetitive

U.S.

Federal
question

Other;
arbitration;
statutory

$260 million

Cayman
Islands

Indonesia

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Federal
question

Other;
securities

Unknown
(at least
$5,270,000)

Various

Belgium; U.S.

Plaintiff

Reactive

Citizenship Party Seeking
of Defendant
ASI

Repetitive
or Reactive
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Disposition if No
Settlement

Appeal

Motion to
Dismiss

Summary
Judgment
Motion

Foreign
Forum(s)

In re Vivendi
Universal, S.A. Sec.
Litig., 2009 WL
3859066 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 19, 2009)

02-cv05571

ASI denied

Yes.

No appeal
on ASI
(2d Cir.)

Denied in
part

Denied

France

Indus. Mar. Carriers
(Bah.), Inc. v. Barwil
Agencies A.S.,
2003 WL 22533704
(E.D. La. Nov. 5, 2003)

03-cv01688

ASI denied

Yes.

No appeal
(5th Cir.)

Denied

Denied

Turkey

Interdigital Tech. Co. v.
Pegatron Corp.,
2015 WL 3958257
(N.D. Cal. June 29,
2015)

15-cv02584

ASI granted

No. Judgment for
plaintiff,
compelling
arbitration.

No appeal
(9th Cir.)

None

None

Taiwan

Int’l Equity Invs., Inc.
v. Opportunity Equity
Partners, 441 F. Supp.
2d 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)

05-cv02745

ASI granted

Yes.

2d Cir.
affirmed

Denied

None

Brazil

Int’l Safety Access
Corp. v. Integrity
Worldwide, Inc.,
2009 WL 10684864
(D.S.C. May 27, 2009)

09-cv00315

ASI granted

No. Judgment for
defendant.

No appeal
(4th Cir.)

Denied

Partial
motion
granted

Canada

Investcom Consortium
Holding SA v. Wilmot,
2009 WL 958725 (S.D.
Tex. Apr. 3, 2009)

08-cv02786

ASI denied

Yes.

5th Cir.
dismissed

Denied

None

Ghana

Jolen, Inc. v. Kundan
Rice Mills, Ltd.,
2019 WL 1559173
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2019)

19-cv01296

ASI granted

No. Judgment for
plaintiff,
confirming
arbitration award.

No appeal
(2d Cir.)

None

None

India

Juniper Networks, Inc.
v. Bahattab, 2011 WL
13262819 (D.D.C. May
25, 2011)

07-cv01771

ASI denied

Yes.

No appeal
(D.C. Cir.)

Denied

Granted in
part

United Arab
Emirates

Karaha Bodas Co. v.
Perusahaan
Pertambangan Minyak
Dan Gas Bumi Negara,
264 F. Supp. 2d 470
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 26,
2002)

01-cv00634

ASI
granted;
reversed

No. Summary
judgment for
plaintiff,
confirming
arbitration award.

5th Cir.
reversed

Partial
motion
granted

Granted

Various (ASI
sought
against
Indonesian
action)

Keep on Kicking
Music, Ltd. v. Hibbert,
268 F. Supp. 3d 585
(S.D.N.Y. 2017)

15-cv07464

ASI granted

Yes.

No appeal
(2d Cir.)

Granted in
part

None

Jamaica
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Filed First
(U.S./
Abroad)

Basis of
Jurisdiction

Case Type

Amount in
Controversy

Citizenship
of Plaintiff

U.S.

Federal
question

Other;
securities

$49.7
million

U.S.; France;
England;
Netherlands

France

Plaintiff

Reactive

Turkey

Federal
question;
admiralty and
maritime

Contract

$3,000,000

Bahamas

South Korea

Plaintiff

Reactive

Taiwan

Diversity

Contract;
arbitration

Unknown
(over
$75,000)

U.S.

Taiwan

Plaintiff

Reactive

Brazil

Diversity

Contract

Unknown
(over $300
million)

Plaintiff

Repetitive

U.S.

Diversity

Contract

Unknown
(over
$75,000)

U.S.

Canada

Plaintiff

Reactive

Ghana

Federal
question

Other;
arbitration;
shareholder
dispute

Unknown
(over
$75,000)

British Virgin
Islands;
Lebanon;
Ghana

U.S.

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Diversity

Other;
arbitration

Unknown
(over
$75,000)

U.S.

India

Plaintiff

Reactive

United Arab
Emirates

Federal
question

Patent

Unknown

U.S.

Saudi Arabia

Plaintiff

Reactive

Switzerland

Federal
question

Arbitration;
contract

$261 million

Cayman
Islands

Indonesia

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Federal
question

Other;
contract

Unknown

U.K.

Jamaica

Plaintiff

Reactive

Citizenship Party Seeking
of Defendant
ASI

U.S.; Cayman
Cayman
Islands
Islands; Brazil

Repetitive
or Reactive
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Docket
No.

ASI or Stay
Granted or
Denied

Settlement? And
Disposition if No
Settlement

Appeal

Motion to
Dismiss

Summary
Judgment
Motion

Foreign
Forum(s)

Lite On It Corp v.
Toshiba Corp.,
2009 WL 10673953
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 12,
2009)

07-cv04758

ASI denied

Yes.

No appeal
(9th Cir.)

None

Denied

Taiwan

Lockheed Martin Corp.
v. Aceworld Holdings
PTY Ltd., 2019 WL
3767553 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 9, 2019)

19-cv04074

ASI granted

Yes.

9th Cir.
dismissed

None

None

Australia

MacDermid Offshore
Sols., LLC v. Niche
Prods., LLC, 2013 WL
3980870 (S.D. Tex.
Aug. 2, 2013)

12-cv02483

ASI granted

Yes.

No appeal
on ASI
(5th Cir.)

Denied

None

England

Macneil Auto. Prods.,
Ltd. v. Cannon Auto.
Ltd., 2013 WL
12155279 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 4, 2013)

08-cv00139

ASI granted

No. Jury verdict for
plaintiff.

7th Cir.
affirmed

Denied

Denied

England

MacPhail v.
Oceaneering Int’l, Inc.,
186 F. Supp. 2d 704
(S.D. Tex. 2002)

01-cv00266

ASI
granted;
reversed

Yes.

5th Cir.
reversed

Denied

None

Australia

Maroc Fruit Bd. S.A. v.
M/V Almeda Star,
961 F. Supp. 2d 362 (D.
Mass. 2013)

11-cv12091

ASI denied

Yes.

No appeal
(1st Cir.)

None

None

England

MasterCard Int’l Inc. v.
Argencard Sociedad
Anonima, 2002 WL
432379 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
20, 2002)

01-cv03027

ASI denied

Yes.

No appeal
(2d Cir.)

Denied

Filed; not
decided

Argentina

MasterCard Int’l Inc. v.
Fédération
Internationale de
Football Ass’n,
2007 WL 631312
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28,
2007)

06-cv03036

ASI granted

Yes.

No appeal
on ASI
(2d Cir.)

Denied

None

Switzerland

Mastronardi Int’l Ltd.
v. SunSelect Produce
(Cal.), Inc., 437 F.
Supp. 3d 772 (E.D. Cal.
2020)

18-cv00737

ASI denied

Yes.

No appeal
(9th Cir.)

Denied

None

Canada
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Filed First
(U.S./
Abroad)

Basis of
Jurisdiction

Case Type

Amount in
Controversy

Citizenship
of Plaintiff

U.S.

Diversity

Contract;
arbitration

Unknown
(over
$75,000)

Taiwan; U.S.

Japan

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Diversity

Contract

Unknown
(over
$75,000)

U.S.

Australia

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Federal
question

Intellectual
property

Unknown

U.S.

U.S.; England

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Diversity

Contract

$28 million

U.S.

England

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Federal
question;
admiralty and
maritime

Tort

Unknown

New Zealand

U.S.

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Federal
question

Contract

$1,250,000

Morocco

Poland

Plaintiff

Reactive

Argentina

Diversity

Contract

Unknown

U.S.

Argentina

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Diversity

Contract

$180 million

U.S.

Switzerland

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Federal
question

Other;
statutory;
contract

$400,000

U.S.

U.S.

Plaintiff

Reactive

Citizenship Party Seeking
of Defendant
ASI

Repetitive
or Reactive
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Docket
No.

Case

ASI or Stay
Granted or
Denied

Settlement? And
Disposition if No
Settlement

Appeal

Motion to
Dismiss

Summary
Judgment
Motion

Foreign
Forum(s)

ASI denied

Yes.

No appeal
(9th Cir.)

Filed; not
decided
(withdrawn)

Denied

Finland;
France;
Sweden;
Netherlands;
Canada;
Mexico;
Spain; EU

10-cv01823

ASI granted

No. Jury verdict for
plaintiff.

9th Cir.
affirmed

Denied in
part

Denied in
part; motion
for judgment
on pleadings
denied

Germany

Midmark Corp. v.
Janak Healthcare Priv.
Ltd, 2014 WL 2737996
(S.D. Ohio June 17,
2014)

14-cv00088

ASI granted

No. Judgment for
plaintiff,
compelling
arbitration.

No appeal
(6th Cir.)

Denied

None

India

Motorola Credit Corp.
v. Uzan, 2003 WL
56998 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7,
2003)

02-cv00666

ASI granted

No. Judgment for
plaintiffs.

No appeal
on ASI
(2d Cir.)

Denied

None

Turkey

Murphy Oil USA, Inc.
v. SR Int’l Bus. Ins.,
2007 WL 2752366
(W.D. Ark. Sept. 20,
2007)

07-cv01071

ASI denied

No. Dismissal
pursuant to English
court’s ASI.

No appeal
(8th Cir.)

Filed; not
decided

None

England

Nike, Inc. v. Cardarelli,
2015 WL 853008 (D.
Or. Feb. 26, 2015)

14-cv01690

ASI denied

Yes.

No appeal
(9th Cir.)

Filed; not
decided

Filed; not
decided

Italy

Ocean World Lines,
Inc. v. Transocean
Shipping
Transportagentur
GesmbH, 2020 WL
3250734 (S.D.N.Y.
June 16, 2020)

19-cv00043

ASI denied;
judgment
for movant

No. Judgment for
plaintiff,
confirming
arbitration award.

No appeal
(2d Cir.)

None

None

Austria

Optis Wireless Tech.,
LLC v. Huawei Techs.
Co., 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 81561 (E.D.
Tex. Apr. 24, 2018)

17-cv00123

ASI denied

Yes.

No appeal
(5th Cir.)

Partial
motion
granted

Partial
motion
denied

China

Oracle Am., Inc. v.
Myriad Grp. AG,
2012 WL 146364 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 17, 2012)

10-cv05604

ASI granted

Yes.

No appeal
on ASI
(9th Cir.)

Denied

None

England

Microsoft Corp. v.
Lindows.com, Inc.,
319 F. Supp. 2d 1219
(W.D. Wash. 2004)

01-cv02115

Microsoft Corp. v.
Motorola, Inc., 871 F.
Supp. 2d 1089 (W.D.
Wash. 2012)
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Filed First
(U.S./
Abroad)

Basis of
Jurisdiction

Case Type

Amount in
Controversy

Citizenship
of Plaintiff

U.S.

Federal
question

Trademark

Unknown
(settled for
$20 million)

U.S.

U.S.

Defendant

Repetitive

U.S.

U.S.

Plaintiff

Reactive

Citizenship Party Seeking
of Defendant
ASI

Repetitive
or Reactive

U.S.

Diversity

Patent

Unknown
(jury
awarded
over $11
million)

India

Federal
question

Other;
commercial;
arbitration

Unknown

U.S.

India

Defendant

Repetitive

U.S.

Federal
question

Other;
racketeering

Unknown
(over $6.9
billion)

U.S.; Finland

Turkey

Plaintiff

Reactive

England

Diversity

Contract

Unknown
(over
$75,000)

U.S.

Bermuda;
Germany

Plaintiff

Reactive

Italy

Diversity

Contract;
employment

Unknown
(over
$75,000)

U.S.

Italy

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Federal
question

Other;
arbitration

$140,000

U.S.

Austria

Plaintiff

Reactive

China

Federal
question

Patent

Unknown

U.S.

China; U.S.

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Federal
question

Trademark;
copyright;
contract

Over
$75,000

U.S.

U.S.;
Switzerland

Plaintiff

Reactive
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Docket
No.

ASI or Stay
Granted or
Denied

Settlement? And
Disposition if No
Settlement

Appeal

Motion to
Dismiss

Summary
Judgment
Motion

Foreign
Forum(s)

Paramedics
Electromedicina
Comercial Ltda. v. GE
Med. Sys. Info. Techs.,
Inc., 2003 WL
23641529 (S.D.N.Y.
June 4, 2003)

02-cv09369

ASI granted

No. Judgment for
defendant.

2d Cir.
affirmed

None

None

Brazil

Parasoft Corp. v.
Parasoft S.A., 2015 WL
12645754 (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 19, 2015)

14-cv09166

ASI granted

Yes. Default
judgment for
plaintiff.

No appeal
(9th Cir.)

None

None

France

Penson Fin. Servs., Inc.
v. MISR Sec. Int’l,
2008 WL 11349751
(N.D. Tex. May 20,
2008); Penson Fin.
Servs., Inc. v. MISR
Sec. Int’l, 2007 WL
4322150 (N.D. Tex.
Dec. 10, 2007)

07-cv00372

ASI granted

No. Judgment for
plaintiff,
confirming
arbitration award.

No appeal
(5th Cir.)

None

None

Egypt

Po-Hai Tang v. CS
Clean Sys. AG,
2011 WL 4073653
(S.D. Cal. Sept. 13,
2011)

11-cv00212

ASI denied

Yes.

No appeal
(9th Cir.)

Joint
motion to
dismiss
granted
(settlement)

None

Germany

Rain Forest Adventures
(Holdings) Ltd. v. AIG
Ins. Hong Kong Ltd.,
2020 WL 1288573
(S.D. Fla. Mar. 18,
2020)

19-cv23698

ASI granted

Yes. Motion to
dismiss and compel
arbitration granted.

Appeal
voluntarily
dismissed
(11th Cir.)

Granted in
part

None

Hong Kong

Rancho Holdings, LLC
v. Manzanillo Assocs.,
2013 WL 6055223
(W.D. Mo. Nov. 14,
2013)

10-cv00997

ASI granted

No. Summary
judgment for
plaintiff; ASI
granted later.

No appeal
on ASI
(8th Cir.)

None

Granted

Costa Rica

Rosenbloom v.
Barclays Bank PLC,
2014 WL 2726136
(N.D. Ill. June 16,
2014)

13-cv04087

ASI denied

Yes.

No appeal
(7th Cir.)

Filed; not
decided

None

England

07-cv07032

ASI denied
as moot;
motion to
dismiss
granted

No. Dismissal in
favor of foreign
proceedings.

Appeal
withdrawn
(2d Cir.)

Granted

None

England

Seaton Ins. v. Cavell
USA, Inc., 2008 WL
8943879 (S.D.N.Y.
May 14, 2008)
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Filed First
(U.S./
Abroad)

Basis of
Jurisdiction

Case Type

Amount in
Controversy

Citizenship
of Plaintiff

U.S.

Federal
question

Arbitration;
contract

$1,159,129

Brazil

U.S.

Defendant

Repetitive

France

Diversity

Contract

$617,000

U.S.

France

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Diversity

Contract

$754,000

U.S.

Egypt

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Diversity

Other;
contract; tort

$6,000,000

U.S.

Germany

Plaintiff

Reactive

Hong Kong

Diversity

Tort;
insurance

Unknown

U.S.; Saint
Lucia

Hong Kong

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Diversity

Contract

$750,000

U.S.

U.S.

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Diversity

Contract

Unknown

U.S.

England

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Diversity

Contract;
insurance

$27 million

U.S.

U.S.; U.K.

Plaintiff

Reactive

Citizenship Party Seeking
of Defendant
ASI

Repetitive
or Reactive
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No.

ASI or Stay
Granted or
Denied

Settlement? And
Disposition if No
Settlement

Appeal

Motion to
Dismiss

Summary
Judgment
Motion

Foreign
Forum(s)

SEC v. Pension Fund of
Am., L.C., 613 F. Supp.
2d 1341 (S.D. Fla.
2009)

05-cv20863

ASI granted

Yes.

No appeal
on ASI
(11th Cir.)

Filed; not
decided

Partial
motion
granted

Costa Rica

Sector Navigation Co.
v. M/V Captain P,
2007 WL 854311 (E.D.
La. Mar. 15, 2007)

06-cv01788

ASI denied

Yes.

No appeal
(5th Cir.)

Denied

None

Nigeria

Seven Arts Filmed Ent.
Ltd. v. Content Media
Corp., 2011 WL
13220422 (C.D. Cal.
Oct. 27, 2011)

11-cv04603

ASI denied;
judgment
for movant

No. Dismissal as
time barred.

No appeal
on ASI
(9th Cir.)

Granted

None

England

SG Avipro Fin. Ltd. v.
Cameroon Airlines,
2005 WL 1353955
(S.D.N.Y. June 8,
2005)

05-cv00655

ASI granted

No. Judgment for
plaintiff,
compelling
arbitration.

No appeal
(2d Cir.)

Denied

Denied

Cameroon

Sindhi v. Raina,
2018 WL 1964198
(N.D. Tex. Apr. 26,
2018)

15-cv03229

ASI granted

No. Disputed
default judgment
for plaintiff.

No appeal
on ASI
(5th Cir.)

Stricken

None

India

No appeal
on ASI
(5th Cir.)

Granted

None

Morocco

Skidmore Energy, Inc.
v. KPMG, 2004 WL
2804888 (N.D. Tex.
Dec. 3, 2004)

03-cv02138

ASI denied

No. Dismissal for
lack of personal and
subject matter
jurisdiction and
failure to state a
claim.

Software AG, Inc. v.
Consist Software Sols.,
Inc., 2008 WL 563449
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21,
2008)

08-cv00389

ASI granted

No. Judgment for
plaintiff.

2d Cir.
affirmed

Denied

None

Brazil

Sonera Holdings B.V.
v. Çukorova Holdings
A.Ş., 2013 WL
2050914 (S.D.N.Y.
May 15, 2013)

11-cv08909

ASI
granted;
vacated;
motion to
dismiss
granted

No. Dismissal for
lack of personal
jurisdiction.

2d Cir.
vacated

Granted

None

British
Virgin
Islands

Sony Corp. v. Fujifilm
Holdings Corp.,
2017 WL 432126
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28,
2017)

16-cv05988

ASI denied

Yes.

No appeal
(2d Cir.)

None

None

Japan
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Filed First
(U.S./
Abroad)

Basis of
Jurisdiction

Case Type

Amount in
Controversy

Citizenship
of Plaintiff

U.S.

Federal
question

Other;
securities

$8,030,000

U.S.

U.S.; Cayman
Islands

Defendant

Reactive

Nigeria

Federal
question;
admiralty and
maritime

Tort;
property

$3,500,000

Unknown
(non-U.S.)

Unknown

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Federal
question

Copyright

$20 million

England;
Wales

England;
Wales; U.S.;
Canada

Plaintiff

Reactive

Cameroon

Federal
question

Arbitration;
contract

Unknown

British Virgin
Islands;
Singapore

Cameroon

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Federal
question

Copyright

Unknown

U.S.

India

Plaintiff

Reactive

Plaintiff

Reactive

Citizenship Party Seeking
of Defendant
ASI

Repetitive
or Reactive

Morocco

Federal
question

Other;
antitrust;
racketeering

$3 billion

U.S.

Switzerland;
Netherlands;
Morocco;
U.S.; Saudi
Arabia;
Principality of
Liechtenstein;
Sudan;
England

U.S.

Federal
question

Trademark

Unknown
(over
$75,000)

U.S.;
Germany

U.S.; Brazil

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Diversity

Arbitration

$932 million

Netherlands

Turkey

Plaintiff

Reactive

Japan

Federal
question

Patent;
contract

Unknown

Japan; U.S.

Japan; U.S.

Plaintiff

Reactive
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Settlement
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Dismiss

Summary
Judgment
Motion

Foreign
Forum(s)

Stolt Tankers BV v.
Allianz Seguros, S.A.,
2011 WL 2436662
(S.D.N.Y. June 16,
2011)

11-cv02331

ASI granted

No. Judgment for
plaintiff,
compelling
arbitration.

Appeal
withdrawn
(2d Cir.)

None

None

Brazil

Storm LLC v. Telenor
Mobile Comms. AS,
2006 WL 3735657
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15,
2006)

06-cv13157

ASI granted

No. Judgment for
defendant,
compelling
arbitration.

No appeal
on ASI
(2d Cir.)

None

None

Ukraine

Suchodolski Assocs.,
Inc. v. Cardell Fin.
Corp., 2006 WL
3327625 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 16, 2006);
Suchodolski Assocs.,
Inc. v. Cardell Fin.
Corp., 2006 WL 10886
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2006)

03-cv04148

ASI granted

No. Judgment for
defendant.

2d Cir.
affirmed

None

None

Brazil

SynCardia Sys., Inc. v.
MEDOS
Medizintechnik, A.G.,
2008 WL 11339957 (D.
Ariz. Jan. 28, 2008)

06-cv00515

ASI denied

Yes.

No appeal
(9th Cir.)

None

None

Germany

ASI granted

No. Grant of
plaintiff’s disputed
motion for
voluntary dismissal;
grant of defendant’s
motion for
attorneys’ fees.

No appeal
on ASI
(9th Cir.)

Partial
motion
granted

Filed; not
decided

Egypt

Granted in
part; denied
in part

Partial
motion
denied

France;
U.K.; Brazil;
Russia;
Argentina;
Germany

Tahaya Misr Inv., Inc.
v. Helwan Cement
S.A.E., 2016 WL
4072332 (C.D. Cal.
July 27, 2016)

16-cv01001

TCL Commc’n Tech.
Holdings, Ltd. v.
Telefonaktienbolaget
LM Ericsson, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS
191512 (C.D. Cal. June
29, 2015)

14-cv00341

ASI granted

Yes.

No appeal
on ASI
(9th Cir.)

Teck Metals Ltd. v.
Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd’s, London,
2009 WL 4716037
(E.D. Wash. Dec. 8,
2009)

05-cv00411

ASI granted
in part

Yes.

No appeal
on ASI
(9th Cir.)

Granted
pursuant to
settlement

Denied;
partial
motion
granted

Canada

Teller v. Dogge,
2012 WL 4792912 (D.
Nev. Oct. 9, 2012)

12-cv00591

ASI denied

Yes. Default
judgment for
plaintiff.

No appeal
(9th Cir.)

None

Denied in
part

Belgium
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Filed First
(U.S./
Abroad)

Basis of
Jurisdiction

Case Type

Amount in
Controversy

Citizenship
of Plaintiff

Brazil

Federal
question;
admiralty and
maritime

Arbitration

Unknown

Netherlands

Brazil

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Federal
question

Other;
commercial;
arbitration

Unknown

Ukraine

Norway

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Federal
question

Other;
arbitration

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Defendant

Repetitive

U.S.

Diversity

Contract

€500,000

U.S.

Germany

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Diversity

Contract

$3 billion

U.S.

Egypt; Italy

Defendant

Repetitive

U.S.

Diversity

Contract;
patent

Unknown
(over
$75,000)

China; U.S.

U.S.; Sweden

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.; Canada
(same day)

28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(d)

Insurance

Unknown

Switzerland

England;
Ireland

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Federal
question

Copyright

Unknown

U.S.

Unknown

Plaintiff

Reactive

Citizenship Party Seeking
of Defendant
ASI

Repetitive
or Reactive
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Motion to
Dismiss

Summary
Judgment
Motion

Foreign
Forum(s)

Temporary Servs. Ins.
v. O’Donnell, 2008 WL
11435777 (M.D. Fla.
Mar. 26, 2008)

07-cv01507

ASI denied

Yes.

No appeal
(11th Cir.)

Denied

Granted in
part; denied
in part

Cayman
Islands

Thermo Fisher Sci. Inc.
v. Ducharme, 2008 WL
11399557 (S.D. Tex.
Sept. 30, 2008)

08-cv00009

ASI denied

Yes.

No appeal
(5th Cir.)

Denied

Granted in
part; denied
in part

Mexico

ASI granted

No. Judgment for
defendant,
compelling
arbitration; later
confirmation of
arbitration award.

No appeal
(2d Cir.)

None

None

Israel

Denied in
part

Filed; not
decided

U.K.

T-Jat Sys. 2006 Ltd v.
Amdocs Software Sys.
Ltd., 2013 WL 6409476
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9,
2013)

13-cv05356

TQ Delta, LLC v.
ZyXEL Commc’ns,
Inc., 2018 WL 2932728
(D. Del. June 12, 2018)

13-cv02013

ASI denied

Yes.

Settled
while
pending
(Fed Cir.
applying 3d
Cir. law)

Travelport Glob.
Distrib. Sys. B.V. v.
Bellview Airlines Ltd.,
2012 WL 3925856
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10,
2012)

12-cv03483

ASI granted

No. Judgment for
plaintiff,
compelling
arbitration.

No appeal
(2d Cir.)

None

None

Nigeria

Trikona Advisers Ltd.
v. Chugh, 2012 WL
4759198 (D. Conn. Oct.
5, 2012)

11-cv02015

ASI denied

No. Summary
judgment for
defendant.

No appeal
on ASI
(2d Cir.)

Denied as
moot

Granted

Cayman
Islands

Vringo, Inc. v. ZTE
Corp., 2015 WL
3498634 (S.D.N.Y.
June 3, 2015)

14-cv04988

ASI denied

Yes.

No appeal
(2d Cir.)

None

None

China

Weyerhaeuser Co. v.
Hiscox Dedicated Corp.
Members Ltd.,
2019 WL 4082976
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 29,
2019)

19-cv01277

ASI granted

Yes.

No appeal
(9th Cir.)

Filed; not
decided

None

U.K.

WTA Tour, Inc. v.
Super Slam Ltd., 339 F.
Supp. 3d 390 (S.D.N.Y.
2018)

18-cv05601

ASI granted
in part,
denied in
part

Yes.

No appeal
(2d Cir.)

Denied

None

Cyprus;
Spain;
Romania
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Filed First
(U.S./
Abroad)

Basis of
Jurisdiction

Case Type

Amount in
Controversy

Citizenship
of Plaintiff

Cayman
Islands

Diversity

Tort;
contract

Unknown
(over
$75,000)

Cayman
Islands

U.S.

Defendant

Repetitive

Mexico

Diversity

Contract

$134,109

U.S.

U.S.

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Federal
question

Arbitration

$2,250,000

Israel

Bailiwick of
Guernsey

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Federal
question

Patent

Unknown

U.S.

Taiwan; U.S.

Defendant

Repetitive

Nigeria

Federal
question

Contract;
arbitration

Unknown
(at least
$100,000)

Netherlands

Nigeria

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Diversity

Tort

$885,000

Cayman
Islands; India

U.S.

Plaintiff

Reactive

China

Diversity

Contract

Unknown
(over
$75,000)

U.S.

China; U.S.

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Diversity

Contract;
insurance

Unknown
(over
$75,000)

U.S.

U.K.

Plaintiff

Reactive

Cyprus;
Spain;
Romania

Federal
question

Arbitration;
tort

Unknown

U.S.

Cyprus

Plaintiff

Reactive

Citizenship Party Seeking
of Defendant
ASI

Repetitive
or Reactive
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Case

Docket
No.

ASI or Stay
Granted or
Denied

Settlement? And
Disposition if No
Settlement

Appeal

Motion to
Dismiss

Summary
Judgment
Motion

Foreign
Forum(s)

Younis Bros. & Co. v.
CIGNA Worldwide
Ins., 167 F. Supp. 2d
743 (E.D. Pa. 2001)

91-cv06784

ASI granted

No. Judgment for
defendant.

No appeal
on ASI
(3d Cir.)

Denied

Denied

Liberia

Zimnicki v. Neo-Neon
Int’l, Ltd., 2009 WL
2392065 (N.D. Ill. July
30, 2009)

06-cv04879

ASI denied

Yes.

No appeal
(7th Cir.)

Granted
pursuant to
settlement

Filed; not
decided

China

Zynga, Inc. v. Vostu
USA, Inc., 816 F. Supp.
2d 824 (N.D. Cal.
2011)

11-cv02959

ASI denied

Yes.

No appeal
on ASI
(9th Cir.)

Filed; not
decided

None

Brazil
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Filed First
(U.S./
Abroad)

Basis of
Jurisdiction

Case Type

Amount in
Controversy

Citizenship
of Plaintiff

U.S.

Diversity

Contract;
insurance

$66.5
million

Liberia

U.S.

Defendant

Repetitive

U.S.

Federal
question

Copyright

Unknown

U.S.

China; U.S.

Plaintiff

Reactive

U.S.

Federal
question

Copyright

Unknown

U.S.

U.S.; Brazil

Defendant

Repetitive

Citizenship Party Seeking
of Defendant
ASI

Repetitive
or Reactive
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